Add a new fscrypt ioctl, FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS. Given a key specified by 'struct fscrypt_key_specifier' (the same way a key is specified for the other fscrypt key management ioctls), it returns status information in a 'struct fscrypt_get_key_status_arg'. The main motivation for this is that applications need to be able to check whether an encrypted directory is "unlocked" or not, so that they can add the key if it is not, and avoid adding the key (which may involve prompting the user for a passphrase) if it already is. It's possible to use some workarounds such as checking whether opening a regular file fails with ENOKEY, or checking whether the filenames "look like gibberish" or not. However, no workaround is usable in all cases. Like the other key management ioctls, the keyrings syscalls may seem at first to be a good fit for this. Unfortunately, they are not. Even if we exposed the keyring ID of the ->s_master_keys keyring and gave everyone Search permission on it (note: currently the keyrings permission system would also allow everyone to "invalidate" the keyring too), the fscrypt keys have an additional state that doesn't map cleanly to the keyrings API: the secret can be removed, but we can be still tracking the files that were using the key, and the removal can be re-attempted or the secret added again. After later patches, some applications will also need a way to determine whether a key was added by the current user vs. by some other user. Reserved fields are included in fscrypt_get_key_status_arg for this and other future extensions. Reviewed-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
608 lines
17 KiB
C
608 lines
17 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
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/*
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* Filesystem-level keyring for fscrypt
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*
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* Copyright 2019 Google LLC
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*/
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/*
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* This file implements management of fscrypt master keys in the
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* filesystem-level keyring, including the ioctls:
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*
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* - FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY
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* - FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY
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* - FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS
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*
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* See the "User API" section of Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst for more
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* information about these ioctls.
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*/
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#include <linux/key-type.h>
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#include <linux/seq_file.h>
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#include "fscrypt_private.h"
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static void wipe_master_key_secret(struct fscrypt_master_key_secret *secret)
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{
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memzero_explicit(secret, sizeof(*secret));
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}
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static void move_master_key_secret(struct fscrypt_master_key_secret *dst,
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struct fscrypt_master_key_secret *src)
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{
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memcpy(dst, src, sizeof(*dst));
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memzero_explicit(src, sizeof(*src));
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}
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static void free_master_key(struct fscrypt_master_key *mk)
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{
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wipe_master_key_secret(&mk->mk_secret);
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kzfree(mk);
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}
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static inline bool valid_key_spec(const struct fscrypt_key_specifier *spec)
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{
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if (spec->__reserved)
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return false;
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return master_key_spec_len(spec) != 0;
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}
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static int fscrypt_key_instantiate(struct key *key,
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struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
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{
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key->payload.data[0] = (struct fscrypt_master_key *)prep->data;
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return 0;
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}
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static void fscrypt_key_destroy(struct key *key)
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{
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free_master_key(key->payload.data[0]);
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}
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static void fscrypt_key_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m)
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{
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seq_puts(m, key->description);
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if (key_is_positive(key)) {
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const struct fscrypt_master_key *mk = key->payload.data[0];
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if (!is_master_key_secret_present(&mk->mk_secret))
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seq_puts(m, ": secret removed");
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}
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}
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/*
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* Type of key in ->s_master_keys. Each key of this type represents a master
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* key which has been added to the filesystem. Its payload is a
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* 'struct fscrypt_master_key'. The "." prefix in the key type name prevents
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* users from adding keys of this type via the keyrings syscalls rather than via
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* the intended method of FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY.
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*/
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static struct key_type key_type_fscrypt = {
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.name = "._fscrypt",
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.instantiate = fscrypt_key_instantiate,
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.destroy = fscrypt_key_destroy,
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.describe = fscrypt_key_describe,
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};
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/* Search ->s_master_keys */
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static struct key *search_fscrypt_keyring(struct key *keyring,
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struct key_type *type,
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const char *description)
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{
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/*
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* We need to mark the keyring reference as "possessed" so that we
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* acquire permission to search it, via the KEY_POS_SEARCH permission.
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*/
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key_ref_t keyref = make_key_ref(keyring, true /* possessed */);
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keyref = keyring_search(keyref, type, description);
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if (IS_ERR(keyref)) {
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if (PTR_ERR(keyref) == -EAGAIN || /* not found */
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PTR_ERR(keyref) == -EKEYREVOKED) /* recently invalidated */
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keyref = ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
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return ERR_CAST(keyref);
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}
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return key_ref_to_ptr(keyref);
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}
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#define FSCRYPT_FS_KEYRING_DESCRIPTION_SIZE \
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(CONST_STRLEN("fscrypt-") + FIELD_SIZEOF(struct super_block, s_id))
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#define FSCRYPT_MK_DESCRIPTION_SIZE (2 * FSCRYPT_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE + 1)
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static void format_fs_keyring_description(
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char description[FSCRYPT_FS_KEYRING_DESCRIPTION_SIZE],
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const struct super_block *sb)
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{
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sprintf(description, "fscrypt-%s", sb->s_id);
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}
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static void format_mk_description(
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char description[FSCRYPT_MK_DESCRIPTION_SIZE],
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const struct fscrypt_key_specifier *mk_spec)
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{
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sprintf(description, "%*phN",
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master_key_spec_len(mk_spec), (u8 *)&mk_spec->u);
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}
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/* Create ->s_master_keys if needed. Synchronized by fscrypt_add_key_mutex. */
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static int allocate_filesystem_keyring(struct super_block *sb)
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{
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char description[FSCRYPT_FS_KEYRING_DESCRIPTION_SIZE];
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struct key *keyring;
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if (sb->s_master_keys)
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return 0;
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format_fs_keyring_description(description, sb);
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keyring = keyring_alloc(description, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID,
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current_cred(), KEY_POS_SEARCH |
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KEY_USR_SEARCH | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_VIEW,
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KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL, NULL);
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if (IS_ERR(keyring))
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return PTR_ERR(keyring);
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/* Pairs with READ_ONCE() in fscrypt_find_master_key() */
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smp_store_release(&sb->s_master_keys, keyring);
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return 0;
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}
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void fscrypt_sb_free(struct super_block *sb)
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{
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key_put(sb->s_master_keys);
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sb->s_master_keys = NULL;
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}
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/*
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* Find the specified master key in ->s_master_keys.
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* Returns ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY) if not found.
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*/
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struct key *fscrypt_find_master_key(struct super_block *sb,
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const struct fscrypt_key_specifier *mk_spec)
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{
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struct key *keyring;
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char description[FSCRYPT_MK_DESCRIPTION_SIZE];
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/* pairs with smp_store_release() in allocate_filesystem_keyring() */
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keyring = READ_ONCE(sb->s_master_keys);
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if (keyring == NULL)
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return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY); /* No keyring yet, so no keys yet. */
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format_mk_description(description, mk_spec);
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return search_fscrypt_keyring(keyring, &key_type_fscrypt, description);
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}
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/*
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* Allocate a new fscrypt_master_key which contains the given secret, set it as
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* the payload of a new 'struct key' of type fscrypt, and link the 'struct key'
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* into the given keyring. Synchronized by fscrypt_add_key_mutex.
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*/
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static int add_new_master_key(struct fscrypt_master_key_secret *secret,
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const struct fscrypt_key_specifier *mk_spec,
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struct key *keyring)
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{
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struct fscrypt_master_key *mk;
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char description[FSCRYPT_MK_DESCRIPTION_SIZE];
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struct key *key;
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int err;
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mk = kzalloc(sizeof(*mk), GFP_KERNEL);
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if (!mk)
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return -ENOMEM;
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mk->mk_spec = *mk_spec;
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move_master_key_secret(&mk->mk_secret, secret);
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refcount_set(&mk->mk_refcount, 1); /* secret is present */
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INIT_LIST_HEAD(&mk->mk_decrypted_inodes);
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spin_lock_init(&mk->mk_decrypted_inodes_lock);
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format_mk_description(description, mk_spec);
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key = key_alloc(&key_type_fscrypt, description,
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GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID, current_cred(),
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KEY_POS_SEARCH | KEY_USR_SEARCH | KEY_USR_VIEW,
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KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL);
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if (IS_ERR(key)) {
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err = PTR_ERR(key);
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goto out_free_mk;
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}
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err = key_instantiate_and_link(key, mk, sizeof(*mk), keyring, NULL);
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key_put(key);
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if (err)
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goto out_free_mk;
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return 0;
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out_free_mk:
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free_master_key(mk);
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return err;
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}
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#define KEY_DEAD 1
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static int add_existing_master_key(struct fscrypt_master_key *mk,
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struct fscrypt_master_key_secret *secret)
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{
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if (is_master_key_secret_present(&mk->mk_secret))
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return 0;
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if (!refcount_inc_not_zero(&mk->mk_refcount))
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return KEY_DEAD;
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move_master_key_secret(&mk->mk_secret, secret);
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return 0;
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}
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static int add_master_key(struct super_block *sb,
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struct fscrypt_master_key_secret *secret,
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const struct fscrypt_key_specifier *mk_spec)
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{
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static DEFINE_MUTEX(fscrypt_add_key_mutex);
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struct key *key;
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int err;
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mutex_lock(&fscrypt_add_key_mutex); /* serialize find + link */
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retry:
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key = fscrypt_find_master_key(sb, mk_spec);
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if (IS_ERR(key)) {
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err = PTR_ERR(key);
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if (err != -ENOKEY)
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goto out_unlock;
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/* Didn't find the key in ->s_master_keys. Add it. */
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err = allocate_filesystem_keyring(sb);
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if (err)
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goto out_unlock;
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err = add_new_master_key(secret, mk_spec, sb->s_master_keys);
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} else {
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/*
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* Found the key in ->s_master_keys. Re-add the secret if
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* needed.
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*/
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down_write(&key->sem);
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err = add_existing_master_key(key->payload.data[0], secret);
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up_write(&key->sem);
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if (err == KEY_DEAD) {
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/* Key being removed or needs to be removed */
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key_invalidate(key);
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key_put(key);
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goto retry;
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}
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key_put(key);
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}
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out_unlock:
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mutex_unlock(&fscrypt_add_key_mutex);
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return err;
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}
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/*
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* Add a master encryption key to the filesystem, causing all files which were
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* encrypted with it to appear "unlocked" (decrypted) when accessed.
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*
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* For more details, see the "FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY" section of
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* Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst.
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*/
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int fscrypt_ioctl_add_key(struct file *filp, void __user *_uarg)
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{
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struct super_block *sb = file_inode(filp)->i_sb;
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struct fscrypt_add_key_arg __user *uarg = _uarg;
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struct fscrypt_add_key_arg arg;
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struct fscrypt_master_key_secret secret;
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int err;
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if (copy_from_user(&arg, uarg, sizeof(arg)))
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return -EFAULT;
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if (!valid_key_spec(&arg.key_spec))
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return -EINVAL;
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if (arg.raw_size < FSCRYPT_MIN_KEY_SIZE ||
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arg.raw_size > FSCRYPT_MAX_KEY_SIZE)
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return -EINVAL;
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if (memchr_inv(arg.__reserved, 0, sizeof(arg.__reserved)))
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return -EINVAL;
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memset(&secret, 0, sizeof(secret));
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secret.size = arg.raw_size;
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err = -EFAULT;
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if (copy_from_user(secret.raw, uarg->raw, secret.size))
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goto out_wipe_secret;
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err = -EACCES;
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if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
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goto out_wipe_secret;
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err = add_master_key(sb, &secret, &arg.key_spec);
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out_wipe_secret:
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wipe_master_key_secret(&secret);
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return err;
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}
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EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_ioctl_add_key);
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/*
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* Try to evict the inode's dentries from the dentry cache. If the inode is a
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* directory, then it can have at most one dentry; however, that dentry may be
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* pinned by child dentries, so first try to evict the children too.
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*/
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static void shrink_dcache_inode(struct inode *inode)
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{
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struct dentry *dentry;
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if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) {
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dentry = d_find_any_alias(inode);
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if (dentry) {
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shrink_dcache_parent(dentry);
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dput(dentry);
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}
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}
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d_prune_aliases(inode);
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}
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static void evict_dentries_for_decrypted_inodes(struct fscrypt_master_key *mk)
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{
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struct fscrypt_info *ci;
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struct inode *inode;
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struct inode *toput_inode = NULL;
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spin_lock(&mk->mk_decrypted_inodes_lock);
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list_for_each_entry(ci, &mk->mk_decrypted_inodes, ci_master_key_link) {
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inode = ci->ci_inode;
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spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
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if (inode->i_state & (I_FREEING | I_WILL_FREE | I_NEW)) {
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spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
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continue;
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}
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__iget(inode);
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spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
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spin_unlock(&mk->mk_decrypted_inodes_lock);
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shrink_dcache_inode(inode);
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iput(toput_inode);
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toput_inode = inode;
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spin_lock(&mk->mk_decrypted_inodes_lock);
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}
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spin_unlock(&mk->mk_decrypted_inodes_lock);
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iput(toput_inode);
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}
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static int check_for_busy_inodes(struct super_block *sb,
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struct fscrypt_master_key *mk)
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{
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struct list_head *pos;
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size_t busy_count = 0;
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unsigned long ino;
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struct dentry *dentry;
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char _path[256];
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char *path = NULL;
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spin_lock(&mk->mk_decrypted_inodes_lock);
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list_for_each(pos, &mk->mk_decrypted_inodes)
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busy_count++;
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if (busy_count == 0) {
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spin_unlock(&mk->mk_decrypted_inodes_lock);
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return 0;
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}
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{
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/* select an example file to show for debugging purposes */
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struct inode *inode =
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list_first_entry(&mk->mk_decrypted_inodes,
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struct fscrypt_info,
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ci_master_key_link)->ci_inode;
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ino = inode->i_ino;
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dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
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}
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spin_unlock(&mk->mk_decrypted_inodes_lock);
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if (dentry) {
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path = dentry_path(dentry, _path, sizeof(_path));
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dput(dentry);
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}
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if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(path))
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path = "(unknown)";
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fscrypt_warn(NULL,
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"%s: %zu inode(s) still busy after removing key with %s %*phN, including ino %lu (%s)",
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sb->s_id, busy_count, master_key_spec_type(&mk->mk_spec),
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master_key_spec_len(&mk->mk_spec), (u8 *)&mk->mk_spec.u,
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ino, path);
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return -EBUSY;
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}
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static int try_to_lock_encrypted_files(struct super_block *sb,
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struct fscrypt_master_key *mk)
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{
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int err1;
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int err2;
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/*
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* An inode can't be evicted while it is dirty or has dirty pages.
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* Thus, we first have to clean the inodes in ->mk_decrypted_inodes.
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*
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* Just do it the easy way: call sync_filesystem(). It's overkill, but
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* it works, and it's more important to minimize the amount of caches we
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* drop than the amount of data we sync. Also, unprivileged users can
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* already call sync_filesystem() via sys_syncfs() or sys_sync().
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*/
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down_read(&sb->s_umount);
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err1 = sync_filesystem(sb);
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up_read(&sb->s_umount);
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/* If a sync error occurs, still try to evict as much as possible. */
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/*
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* Inodes are pinned by their dentries, so we have to evict their
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* dentries. shrink_dcache_sb() would suffice, but would be overkill
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* and inappropriate for use by unprivileged users. So instead go
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* through the inodes' alias lists and try to evict each dentry.
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*/
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evict_dentries_for_decrypted_inodes(mk);
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/*
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* evict_dentries_for_decrypted_inodes() already iput() each inode in
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* the list; any inodes for which that dropped the last reference will
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* have been evicted due to fscrypt_drop_inode() detecting the key
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* removal and telling the VFS to evict the inode. So to finish, we
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* just need to check whether any inodes couldn't be evicted.
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*/
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err2 = check_for_busy_inodes(sb, mk);
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return err1 ?: err2;
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}
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/*
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* Try to remove an fscrypt master encryption key.
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*
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* First we wipe the actual master key secret, so that no more inodes can be
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* unlocked with it. Then we try to evict all cached inodes that had been
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* unlocked with the key.
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*
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* If all inodes were evicted, then we unlink the fscrypt_master_key from the
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* keyring. Otherwise it remains in the keyring in the "incompletely removed"
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* state (without the actual secret key) where it tracks the list of remaining
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* inodes. Userspace can execute the ioctl again later to retry eviction, or
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* alternatively can re-add the secret key again.
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|
*
|
|
* For more details, see the "Removing keys" section of
|
|
* Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst.
|
|
*/
|
|
int fscrypt_ioctl_remove_key(struct file *filp, void __user *_uarg)
|
|
{
|
|
struct super_block *sb = file_inode(filp)->i_sb;
|
|
struct fscrypt_remove_key_arg __user *uarg = _uarg;
|
|
struct fscrypt_remove_key_arg arg;
|
|
struct key *key;
|
|
struct fscrypt_master_key *mk;
|
|
u32 status_flags = 0;
|
|
int err;
|
|
bool dead;
|
|
|
|
if (copy_from_user(&arg, uarg, sizeof(arg)))
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
if (!valid_key_spec(&arg.key_spec))
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
if (memchr_inv(arg.__reserved, 0, sizeof(arg.__reserved)))
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
|
|
return -EACCES;
|
|
|
|
/* Find the key being removed. */
|
|
key = fscrypt_find_master_key(sb, &arg.key_spec);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(key))
|
|
return PTR_ERR(key);
|
|
mk = key->payload.data[0];
|
|
|
|
down_write(&key->sem);
|
|
|
|
/* Wipe the secret. */
|
|
dead = false;
|
|
if (is_master_key_secret_present(&mk->mk_secret)) {
|
|
wipe_master_key_secret(&mk->mk_secret);
|
|
dead = refcount_dec_and_test(&mk->mk_refcount);
|
|
}
|
|
up_write(&key->sem);
|
|
if (dead) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* No inodes reference the key, and we wiped the secret, so the
|
|
* key object is free to be removed from the keyring.
|
|
*/
|
|
key_invalidate(key);
|
|
err = 0;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* Some inodes still reference this key; try to evict them. */
|
|
err = try_to_lock_encrypted_files(sb, mk);
|
|
if (err == -EBUSY) {
|
|
status_flags |=
|
|
FSCRYPT_KEY_REMOVAL_STATUS_FLAG_FILES_BUSY;
|
|
err = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* We return 0 if we successfully did something: wiped the secret, or
|
|
* tried locking the files again. Users need to check the informational
|
|
* status flags if they care whether the key has been fully removed
|
|
* including all files locked.
|
|
*/
|
|
key_put(key);
|
|
if (err == 0)
|
|
err = put_user(status_flags, &uarg->removal_status_flags);
|
|
return err;
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_ioctl_remove_key);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Retrieve the status of an fscrypt master encryption key.
|
|
*
|
|
* We set ->status to indicate whether the key is absent, present, or
|
|
* incompletely removed. "Incompletely removed" means that the master key
|
|
* secret has been removed, but some files which had been unlocked with it are
|
|
* still in use. This field allows applications to easily determine the state
|
|
* of an encrypted directory without using a hack such as trying to open a
|
|
* regular file in it (which can confuse the "incompletely removed" state with
|
|
* absent or present).
|
|
*
|
|
* For more details, see the "FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS" section of
|
|
* Documentation/filesystems/fscrypt.rst.
|
|
*/
|
|
int fscrypt_ioctl_get_key_status(struct file *filp, void __user *uarg)
|
|
{
|
|
struct super_block *sb = file_inode(filp)->i_sb;
|
|
struct fscrypt_get_key_status_arg arg;
|
|
struct key *key;
|
|
struct fscrypt_master_key *mk;
|
|
int err;
|
|
|
|
if (copy_from_user(&arg, uarg, sizeof(arg)))
|
|
return -EFAULT;
|
|
|
|
if (!valid_key_spec(&arg.key_spec))
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
if (memchr_inv(arg.__reserved, 0, sizeof(arg.__reserved)))
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
memset(arg.__out_reserved, 0, sizeof(arg.__out_reserved));
|
|
|
|
key = fscrypt_find_master_key(sb, &arg.key_spec);
|
|
if (IS_ERR(key)) {
|
|
if (key != ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY))
|
|
return PTR_ERR(key);
|
|
arg.status = FSCRYPT_KEY_STATUS_ABSENT;
|
|
err = 0;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
mk = key->payload.data[0];
|
|
down_read(&key->sem);
|
|
|
|
if (!is_master_key_secret_present(&mk->mk_secret)) {
|
|
arg.status = FSCRYPT_KEY_STATUS_INCOMPLETELY_REMOVED;
|
|
err = 0;
|
|
goto out_release_key;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
arg.status = FSCRYPT_KEY_STATUS_PRESENT;
|
|
err = 0;
|
|
out_release_key:
|
|
up_read(&key->sem);
|
|
key_put(key);
|
|
out:
|
|
if (!err && copy_to_user(uarg, &arg, sizeof(arg)))
|
|
err = -EFAULT;
|
|
return err;
|
|
}
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_ioctl_get_key_status);
|
|
|
|
int __init fscrypt_init_keyring(void)
|
|
{
|
|
return register_key_type(&key_type_fscrypt);
|
|
}
|