[ Upstream commit 7821fa101eab529521aa4b724bf708149d70820c ]
iosf_mbi_pci_{read,write}_mdr() use pci_{read,write}_config_dword()
that return PCIBIOS_* codes but functions also return -ENODEV which are
not compatible error codes. As neither of the functions are related to
PCI read/write functions, they should return normal errnos.
Convert PCIBIOS_* returns code using pcibios_err_to_errno() into normal
errno before returning it.
Fixes: 4618441536 ("arch: x86: New MailBox support driver for Intel SOC's")
Signed-off-by: Ilpo Järvinen <ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240527125538.13620-4-ilpo.jarvinen@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 3a2ba42cbd0b669ce3837ba400905f93dd06c79f upstream.
The bitops compile-time optimization series revealed one more
problem in olpc-xo1-sci.c:send_ebook_state(), resulted in GCC
warnings:
arch/x86/platform/olpc/olpc-xo1-sci.c: In function 'send_ebook_state':
arch/x86/platform/olpc/olpc-xo1-sci.c:83:63: warning: logical not is only applied to the left hand side of comparison [-Wlogical-not-parentheses]
83 | if (!!test_bit(SW_TABLET_MODE, ebook_switch_idev->sw) == state)
| ^~
arch/x86/platform/olpc/olpc-xo1-sci.c:83:13: note: add parentheses around left hand side expression to silence this warning
Despite this code working as intended, this redundant double
negation of boolean value, together with comparing to `char`
with no explicit conversion to bool, makes compilers think
the author made some unintentional logical mistakes here.
Make it the other way around and negate the char instead
to silence the warnings.
Fixes: d2aa37411b ("x86/olpc/xo1/sci: Produce wakeup events for buttons and switches")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.5+
Reported-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Reviewed-and-tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Lobakin <alexandr.lobakin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yury Norov <yury.norov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 1ff2fc02862d52e18fd3daabcfe840ec27e920a8 upstream.
Reserving memory using efi_mem_reserve() calls into the x86
efi_arch_mem_reserve() function. This function will insert a new EFI
memory descriptor into the EFI memory map representing the area of
memory to be reserved and marking it as EFI runtime memory. As part
of adding this new entry, a new EFI memory map is allocated and mapped.
The mapping is where a problem can occur. This new memory map is mapped
using early_memremap() and generally mapped encrypted, unless the new
memory for the mapping happens to come from an area of memory that is
marked as EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DATA memory. In this case, the new memory will
be mapped unencrypted. However, during replacement of the old memory map,
efi_mem_type() is disabled, so the new memory map will now be long-term
mapped encrypted (in efi.memmap), resulting in the map containing invalid
data and causing the kernel boot to crash.
Since it is known that the area will be mapped encrypted going forward,
explicitly map the new memory map as encrypted using early_memremap_prot().
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.14.x
Fixes: 8f716c9b5f ("x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ebf1eb2940405438a09d51d121ec0d02c8755558.1634752931.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com/
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
[ardb: incorporate Kconfig fix by Arnd]
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit c2fe61d8be491ff8188edaf22e838f819999146b ]
Commit
d9e9a64180 ("x86/mm/pti: Allocate a separate user PGD")
changed the PGD allocation to allocate PGD_ALLOCATION_ORDER pages, so in
the error path it should be freed using free_pages() rather than
free_page().
Commit
06ace26f4e ("x86/efi: Free efi_pgd with free_pages()")
fixed one instance of this, but missed another.
Move the freeing out-of-line to avoid code duplication and fix this bug.
Fixes: d9e9a64180 ("x86/mm/pti: Allocate a separate user PGD")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201110163919.1134431-1-nivedita@alum.mit.edu
Signed-off-by: Arvind Sankar <nivedita@alum.mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit e3beca48a45b5e0e6e6a4e0124276b8248dcc9bb ]
Quite some non OF/ACPI users of irqdomains allocate firmware nodes of type
IRQCHIP_FWNODE_NAMED or IRQCHIP_FWNODE_NAMED_ID and free them right after
creating the irqdomain. The only purpose of these FW nodes is to convey
name information. When this was introduced the core code did not store the
pointer to the node in the irqdomain. A recent change stored the firmware
node pointer in irqdomain for other reasons and missed to notice that the
usage sites which do the alloc_fwnode/create_domain/free_fwnode sequence
are broken by this. Storing a dangling pointer is dangerous itself, but in
case that the domain is destroyed later on this leads to a double free.
Remove the freeing of the firmware node after creating the irqdomain from
all affected call sites to cure this.
Fixes: 711419e504eb ("irqdomain: Add the missing assignment of domain->fwnode for named fwnode")
Reported-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/873661qakd.fsf@nanos.tec.linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 8319e9d5ad98ffccd19f35664382c73cea216193 upstream.
The mixed mode runtime wrappers are fragile when it comes to how the
memory referred to by its pointer arguments are laid out in memory, due
to the fact that it translates these addresses to physical addresses that
the runtime services can dereference when running in 1:1 mode. Since
vmalloc'ed pages (including the vmap'ed stack) are not contiguous in the
physical address space, this scheme only works if the referenced memory
objects do not cross page boundaries.
Currently, the mixed mode runtime service wrappers require that all by-ref
arguments that live in the vmalloc space have a size that is a power of 2,
and are aligned to that same value. While this is a sensible way to
construct an object that is guaranteed not to cross a page boundary, it is
overly strict when it comes to checking whether a given object violates
this requirement, as we can simply take the physical address of the first
and the last byte, and verify that they point into the same physical page.
When this check fails, we emit a WARN(), but then simply proceed with the
call, which could cause data corruption if the next physical page belongs
to a mapping that is entirely unrelated.
Given that with vmap'ed stacks, this condition is much more likely to
trigger, let's relax the condition a bit, but fail the runtime service
call if it does trigger.
Fixes: f6697df36b ("x86/efi: Prevent mixed mode boot corruption with CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y")
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200221084849.26878-4-ardb@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 63056e8b5ebf41d52170e9f5ba1fc83d1855278c upstream.
Hans reports that his mixed mode systems running v5.6-rc1 kernels hit
the WARN_ON() in virt_to_phys_or_null_size(), caused by the fact that
efi_guid_t objects on the vmap'ed stack happen to be misaligned with
respect to their sizes. As a quick (i.e., backportable) fix, copy GUID
pointer arguments to the local stack into a buffer that is naturally
aligned to its size, so that it is guaranteed to cover only one
physical page.
Note that on x86, we cannot rely on the stack pointer being aligned
the way the compiler expects, so we need to allocate an 8-byte aligned
buffer of sufficient size, and copy the GUID into that buffer at an
offset that is aligned to 16 bytes.
Fixes: f6697df36b ("x86/efi: Prevent mixed mode boot corruption with CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y")
Reported-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200221084849.26878-2-ardb@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit e2d68a955e49d61fd0384f23e92058dc9b79be5e ]
The logic in __efi_enter_virtual_mode() does a number of steps in
sequence, all of which may fail in one way or the other. In most
cases, we simply print an error and disable EFI runtime services
support, but in some cases, we BUG() or panic() and bring down the
system when encountering conditions that we could easily handle in
the same way.
While at it, replace a pointless page-to-virt-phys conversion with
one that goes straight from struct page to physical.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Arvind Sankar <nivedita@alum.mit.edu>
Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200103113953.9571-14-ardb@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit ffc2760bcf2dba0dbef74013ed73eea8310cc52c ]
Fix a couple of issues with the way we map and copy the vendor string:
- we map only 2 bytes, which usually works since you get at least a
page, but if the vendor string happens to cross a page boundary,
a crash will result
- only call early_memunmap() if early_memremap() succeeded, or we will
call it with a NULL address which it doesn't like,
- while at it, switch to early_memremap_ro(), and array indexing rather
than pointer dereferencing to read the CHAR16 characters.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Arvind Sankar <nivedita@alum.mit.edu>
Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 5b83683f32 ("x86: EFI runtime service support")
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200103113953.9571-5-ardb@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit af164898482817a1d487964b68f3c21bae7a1beb ]
Michael Weiser reported that he got this error during a kexec rebooting:
esrt: Unsupported ESRT version 2904149718861218184.
The ESRT memory stays in EFI boot services data, and it was reserved
in kernel via efi_mem_reserve(). The initial purpose of the reservation
is to reuse the EFI boot services data across kexec reboot. For example
the BGRT image data and some ESRT memory like Michael reported.
But although the memory is reserved it is not updated in the X86 E820 table,
and kexec_file_load() iterates system RAM in the IO resource list to find places
for kernel, initramfs and other stuff. In Michael's case the kexec loaded
initramfs overwrote the ESRT memory and then the failure happened.
Since kexec_file_load() depends on the E820 table being updated, just fix this
by updating the reserved EFI boot services memory as reserved type in E820.
Originally any memory descriptors with EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME attribute are
bypassed in the reservation code path because they are assumed as reserved.
But the reservation is still needed for multiple kexec reboots,
and it is the only possible case we come here thus just drop the code
chunk, then everything works without side effects.
On my machine the ESRT memory sits in an EFI runtime data range, it does
not trigger the problem, but I successfully tested with BGRT instead.
both kexec_load() and kexec_file_load() work and kdump works as well.
[ mingo: Edited the changelog. ]
Reported-by: Michael Weiser <michael@weiser.dinsnail.net>
Tested-by: Michael Weiser <michael@weiser.dinsnail.net>
Signed-off-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191204075233.GA10520@dhcp-128-65.nay.redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit d92116b800fb79a72ad26121f5011f6aa3ad94c2 ]
On OLPC XO-1, the RTC is discovered via device tree from the arch
initcall. Don't let the PC platform register another one from its device
initcall, it's not going to work:
sysfs: cannot create duplicate filename '/devices/platform/rtc_cmos'
CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper Not tainted 4.19.0-rc6 #12
Hardware name: OLPC XO/XO, BIOS OLPC Ver 1.00.01 06/11/2014
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x16/0x18
sysfs_warn_dup+0x46/0x58
sysfs_create_dir_ns+0x76/0x9b
kobject_add_internal+0xed/0x209
? __schedule+0x3fa/0x447
kobject_add+0x5b/0x66
device_add+0x298/0x535
? insert_resource_conflict+0x2a/0x3e
platform_device_add+0x14d/0x192
? io_delay_init+0x19/0x19
platform_device_register+0x1c/0x1f
add_rtc_cmos+0x16/0x31
do_one_initcall+0x78/0x14a
? do_early_param+0x75/0x75
kernel_init_freeable+0x152/0x1e0
? rest_init+0xa2/0xa2
kernel_init+0x8/0xd5
ret_from_fork+0x2e/0x38
kobject_add_internal failed for rtc_cmos with -EEXIST, don't try to
register things with the same name in the same directory.
platform rtc_cmos: registered platform RTC device (no PNP device found)
Signed-off-by: Lubomir Rintel <lkundrak@v3.sk>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
CC: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
CC: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
CC: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181004160808.307738-1-lkundrak@v3.sk
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Commit eeb89e2bb1 ("x86/efi: Load fixmap GDT in efi_call_phys_epilog()")
moved loading the fixmap in efi_call_phys_epilog() after load_cr3() since
it was assumed to be more logical.
Turns out this is incorrect: In efi_call_phys_prolog(), the gdt with its
physical address is loaded first, and when the %cr3 is reloaded in _epilog
from initial_page_table to swapper_pg_dir again the gdt is no longer
mapped. This results in a triple fault if an interrupt occurs after
load_cr3() and before load_fixmap_gdt(0). Calling load_fixmap_gdt(0) first
restores the execution order prior to commit eeb89e2bb1 and fixes the
problem.
Fixes: eeb89e2bb1 ("x86/efi: Load fixmap GDT in efi_call_phys_epilog()")
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1536689892-21538-1-git-send-email-linux@roeck-us.net
When PTI is enabled on x86-32 the kernel uses the GDT mapped in the fixmap
for the simple reason that this address is also mapped for user-space.
The efi_call_phys_prolog()/efi_call_phys_epilog() wrappers change the GDT
to call EFI runtime services and switch back to the kernel GDT when they
return. But the switch-back uses the writable GDT, not the fixmap GDT.
When that happened and and the CPU returns to user-space it switches to the
user %cr3 and tries to restore user segment registers. This fails because
the writable GDT is not mapped in the user page-table, and without a GDT
the fault handlers also can't be launched. The result is a triple fault and
reboot of the machine.
Fix that by restoring the GDT back to the fixmap GDT which is also mapped
in the user page-table.
Fixes: 7757d607c6 x86/pti: ('Allow CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION for x86_32')
Reported-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1535702738-10971-1-git-send-email-joro@8bytes.org
Merge L1 Terminal Fault fixes from Thomas Gleixner:
"L1TF, aka L1 Terminal Fault, is yet another speculative hardware
engineering trainwreck. It's a hardware vulnerability which allows
unprivileged speculative access to data which is available in the
Level 1 Data Cache when the page table entry controlling the virtual
address, which is used for the access, has the Present bit cleared or
other reserved bits set.
If an instruction accesses a virtual address for which the relevant
page table entry (PTE) has the Present bit cleared or other reserved
bits set, then speculative execution ignores the invalid PTE and loads
the referenced data if it is present in the Level 1 Data Cache, as if
the page referenced by the address bits in the PTE was still present
and accessible.
While this is a purely speculative mechanism and the instruction will
raise a page fault when it is retired eventually, the pure act of
loading the data and making it available to other speculative
instructions opens up the opportunity for side channel attacks to
unprivileged malicious code, similar to the Meltdown attack.
While Meltdown breaks the user space to kernel space protection, L1TF
allows to attack any physical memory address in the system and the
attack works across all protection domains. It allows an attack of SGX
and also works from inside virtual machines because the speculation
bypasses the extended page table (EPT) protection mechanism.
The assoicated CVEs are: CVE-2018-3615, CVE-2018-3620, CVE-2018-3646
The mitigations provided by this pull request include:
- Host side protection by inverting the upper address bits of a non
present page table entry so the entry points to uncacheable memory.
- Hypervisor protection by flushing L1 Data Cache on VMENTER.
- SMT (HyperThreading) control knobs, which allow to 'turn off' SMT
by offlining the sibling CPU threads. The knobs are available on
the kernel command line and at runtime via sysfs
- Control knobs for the hypervisor mitigation, related to L1D flush
and SMT control. The knobs are available on the kernel command line
and at runtime via sysfs
- Extensive documentation about L1TF including various degrees of
mitigations.
Thanks to all people who have contributed to this in various ways -
patches, review, testing, backporting - and the fruitful, sometimes
heated, but at the end constructive discussions.
There is work in progress to provide other forms of mitigations, which
might be less horrible performance wise for a particular kind of
workloads, but this is not yet ready for consumption due to their
complexity and limitations"
* 'l1tf-final' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (75 commits)
x86/microcode: Allow late microcode loading with SMT disabled
tools headers: Synchronise x86 cpufeatures.h for L1TF additions
x86/mm/kmmio: Make the tracer robust against L1TF
x86/mm/pat: Make set_memory_np() L1TF safe
x86/speculation/l1tf: Make pmd/pud_mknotpresent() invert
x86/speculation/l1tf: Invert all not present mappings
cpu/hotplug: Fix SMT supported evaluation
KVM: VMX: Tell the nested hypervisor to skip L1D flush on vmentry
x86/speculation: Use ARCH_CAPABILITIES to skip L1D flush on vmentry
x86/speculation: Simplify sysfs report of VMX L1TF vulnerability
Documentation/l1tf: Remove Yonah processors from not vulnerable list
x86/KVM/VMX: Don't set l1tf_flush_l1d from vmx_handle_external_intr()
x86/irq: Let interrupt handlers set kvm_cpu_l1tf_flush_l1d
x86: Don't include linux/irq.h from asm/hardirq.h
x86/KVM/VMX: Introduce per-host-cpu analogue of l1tf_flush_l1d
x86/irq: Demote irq_cpustat_t::__softirq_pending to u16
x86/KVM/VMX: Move the l1tf_flush_l1d test to vmx_l1d_flush()
x86/KVM/VMX: Replace 'vmx_l1d_flush_always' with 'vmx_l1d_flush_cond'
x86/KVM/VMX: Don't set l1tf_flush_l1d to true from vmx_l1d_flush()
cpu/hotplug: detect SMT disabled by BIOS
...
Pull x86 timer updates from Thomas Gleixner:
"Early TSC based time stamping to allow better boot time analysis.
This comes with a general cleanup of the TSC calibration code which
grew warts and duct taping over the years and removes 250 lines of
code. Initiated and mostly implemented by Pavel with help from various
folks"
* 'x86-timers-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (37 commits)
x86/kvmclock: Mark kvm_get_preset_lpj() as __init
x86/tsc: Consolidate init code
sched/clock: Disable interrupts when calling generic_sched_clock_init()
timekeeping: Prevent false warning when persistent clock is not available
sched/clock: Close a hole in sched_clock_init()
x86/tsc: Make use of tsc_calibrate_cpu_early()
x86/tsc: Split native_calibrate_cpu() into early and late parts
sched/clock: Use static key for sched_clock_running
sched/clock: Enable sched clock early
sched/clock: Move sched clock initialization and merge with generic clock
x86/tsc: Use TSC as sched clock early
x86/tsc: Initialize cyc2ns when tsc frequency is determined
x86/tsc: Calibrate tsc only once
ARM/time: Remove read_boot_clock64()
s390/time: Remove read_boot_clock64()
timekeeping: Default boot time offset to local_clock()
timekeeping: Replace read_boot_clock64() with read_persistent_wall_and_boot_offset()
s390/time: Add read_persistent_wall_and_boot_offset()
x86/xen/time: Output xen sched_clock time from 0
x86/xen/time: Initialize pv xen time in init_hypervisor_platform()
...
Pull x86 platform updates from Thomas Gleixner:
"Trivial cleanups and improvements"
* 'x86-platform-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/platform/UV: Remove redundant check of p == q
x86/platform/olpc: Use PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO()
x86/platform/UV: Mark memblock related init code and data correctly
Pull EFI updates from Thomas Gleixner:
"The EFI pile:
- Make mixed mode UEFI runtime service invocations mutually
exclusive, as mandated by the UEFI spec
- Perform UEFI runtime services calls from a work queue so the calls
into the firmware occur from a kernel thread
- Honor the UEFI memory map attributes for live memory regions
configured by UEFI as a framebuffer. This works around a coherency
problem with KVM guests running on ARM.
- Cleanups, improvements and fixes all over the place"
* 'efi-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
efivars: Call guid_parse() against guid_t type of variable
efi/cper: Use consistent types for UUIDs
efi/x86: Replace references to efi_early->is64 with efi_is_64bit()
efi: Deduplicate efi_open_volume()
efi/x86: Add missing NULL initialization in UGA draw protocol discovery
efi/x86: Merge 32-bit and 64-bit UGA draw protocol setup routines
efi/x86: Align efi_uga_draw_protocol typedef names to convention
efi/x86: Merge the setup_efi_pci32() and setup_efi_pci64() routines
efi/x86: Prevent reentrant firmware calls in mixed mode
efi/esrt: Only call efi_mem_reserve() for boot services memory
fbdev/efifb: Honour UEFI memory map attributes when mapping the FB
efi: Drop type and attribute checks in efi_mem_desc_lookup()
efi/libstub/arm: Add opt-in Kconfig option for the DTB loader
efi: Remove the declaration of efi_late_init() as the function is unused
efi/cper: Avoid using get_seconds()
efi: Use a work queue to invoke EFI Runtime Services
efi/x86: Use non-blocking SetVariable() for efi_delete_dummy_variable()
efi/x86: Clean up the eboot code
The last missing piece to having vmx_l1d_flush() take interrupts after
VMEXIT into account is to set the kvm_cpu_l1tf_flush_l1d per-cpu flag on
irq entry.
Issue calls to kvm_set_cpu_l1tf_flush_l1d() from entering_irq(),
ipi_entering_ack_irq(), smp_reschedule_interrupt() and
uv_bau_message_interrupt().
Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
The next patch in this series will have to make the definition of
irq_cpustat_t available to entering_irq().
Inclusion of asm/hardirq.h into asm/apic.h would cause circular header
dependencies like
asm/smp.h
asm/apic.h
asm/hardirq.h
linux/irq.h
linux/topology.h
linux/smp.h
asm/smp.h
or
linux/gfp.h
linux/mmzone.h
asm/mmzone.h
asm/mmzone_64.h
asm/smp.h
asm/apic.h
asm/hardirq.h
linux/irq.h
linux/irqdesc.h
linux/kobject.h
linux/sysfs.h
linux/kernfs.h
linux/idr.h
linux/gfp.h
and others.
This causes compilation errors because of the header guards becoming
effective in the second inclusion: symbols/macros that had been defined
before wouldn't be available to intermediate headers in the #include chain
anymore.
A possible workaround would be to move the definition of irq_cpustat_t
into its own header and include that from both, asm/hardirq.h and
asm/apic.h.
However, this wouldn't solve the real problem, namely asm/harirq.h
unnecessarily pulling in all the linux/irq.h cruft: nothing in
asm/hardirq.h itself requires it. Also, note that there are some other
archs, like e.g. arm64, which don't have that #include in their
asm/hardirq.h.
Remove the linux/irq.h #include from x86' asm/hardirq.h.
Fix resulting compilation errors by adding appropriate #includes to *.c
files as needed.
Note that some of these *.c files could be cleaned up a bit wrt. to their
set of #includes, but that should better be done from separate patches, if
at all.
Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
The current implementation of efi_mem_desc_lookup() includes the
following check on the memory descriptor it returns:
if (!(md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME) &&
md->type != EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DATA &&
md->type != EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA) {
continue;
}
This means that only EfiBootServicesData or EfiRuntimeServicesData
regions are considered, or any other region type provided that it
has the EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME attribute set.
Given what the name of the function implies, and the fact that any
physical address can be described in the UEFI memory map only a single
time, it does not make sense to impose this condition in the body of the
loop, but instead, should be imposed by the caller depending on the value
that is returned to it.
Two such callers exist at the moment:
- The BGRT code when running on x86, via efi_mem_reserve() and
efi_arch_mem_reserve(). In this case, the region is already known to
be EfiBootServicesData, and so the check is redundant.
- The ESRT handling code which introduced this function, which calls it
both directly from efi_esrt_init() and again via efi_mem_reserve() and
efi_arch_mem_reserve() [on x86].
So let's move this check into the callers instead. This preserves the
current behavior both for BGRT and ESRT handling, and allows the lookup
routine to be reused by other [upcoming] users that don't have this
limitation.
In the ESRT case, keep the entire condition, so that platforms that
deviate from the UEFI spec and use something other than
EfiBootServicesData for the ESRT table will keep working as before.
For x86's efi_arch_mem_reserve() implementation, limit the type to
EfiBootServicesData, since it is the only type the reservation code
expects to operate on in the first place.
While we're at it, drop the __init annotation so that drivers can use it
as well.
Tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180711094040.12506-8-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Pull x86 updates and fixes from Thomas Gleixner:
- Fix the (late) fallout from the vector management rework causing
hlist corruption and irq descriptor reference leaks caused by a
missing sanity check.
The straight forward fix triggered another long standing issue to
surface. The pre rework code hid the issue due to being way slower,
but now the chance that user space sees an EBUSY error return when
updating irq affinities is way higher, though quite a bunch of
userspace tools do not handle it properly despite the fact that EBUSY
could be returned for at least 10 years.
It turned out that the EBUSY return can be avoided completely by
utilizing the existing delayed affinity update mechanism for irq
remapped scenarios as well. That's a bit more error handling in the
kernel, but avoids fruitless fingerpointing discussions with tool
developers.
- Decouple PHYSICAL_MASK from AMD SME as its going to be required for
the upcoming Intel memory encryption support as well.
- Handle legacy device ACPI detection properly for newer platforms
- Fix the wrong argument ordering in the vector allocation tracepoint
- Simplify the IDT setup code for the APIC=n case
- Use the proper string helpers in the MTRR code
- Remove a stale unused VDSO source file
- Convert the microcode update lock to a raw spinlock as its used in
atomic context.
* 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/intel_rdt: Enable CMT and MBM on new Skylake stepping
x86/apic/vector: Print APIC control bits in debugfs
genirq/affinity: Defer affinity setting if irq chip is busy
x86/platform/uv: Use apic_ack_irq()
x86/ioapic: Use apic_ack_irq()
irq_remapping: Use apic_ack_irq()
x86/apic: Provide apic_ack_irq()
genirq/migration: Avoid out of line call if pending is not set
genirq/generic_pending: Do not lose pending affinity update
x86/apic/vector: Prevent hlist corruption and leaks
x86/vector: Fix the args of vector_alloc tracepoint
x86/idt: Simplify the idt_setup_apic_and_irq_gates()
x86/platform/uv: Remove extra parentheses
x86/mm: Decouple dynamic __PHYSICAL_MASK from AMD SME
x86: Mark native_set_p4d() as __always_inline
x86/microcode: Make the late update update_lock a raw lock for RT
x86/mtrr: Convert to use strncpy_from_user() helper
x86/mtrr: Convert to use match_string() helper
x86/vdso: Remove unused file
x86/i8237: Register device based on FADT legacy boot flag
Pull EFI updates from Ingo Molnar:
"The main EFI changes in this cycle were:
- Fix the apple-properties code (Andy Shevchenko)
- Add WARN() on arm64 if UEFI Runtime Services corrupt the reserved
x18 register (Ard Biesheuvel)
- Use efi_switch_mm() on x86 instead of manipulating %cr3 directly
(Sai Praneeth)
- Fix early memremap leak in ESRT code (Ard Biesheuvel)
- Switch to L"xxx" notation for wide string literals (Ard Biesheuvel)
- ... plus misc other cleanups and bugfixes"
* 'efi-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/efi: Use efi_switch_mm() rather than manually twiddling with %cr3
x86/efi: Replace efi_pgd with efi_mm.pgd
efi: Use string literals for efi_char16_t variable initializers
efi/esrt: Fix handling of early ESRT table mapping
efi: Use efi_mm in x86 as well as ARM
efi: Make const array 'apple' static
efi/apple-properties: Use memremap() instead of ioremap()
efi: Reorder pr_notice() with add_device_randomness() call
x86/efi: Replace GFP_ATOMIC with GFP_KERNEL in efi_query_variable_store()
efi/arm64: Check whether x18 is preserved by runtime services calls
efi/arm*: Stop printing addresses of virtual mappings
efi/apple-properties: Remove redundant attribute initialization from unmarshal_key_value_pairs()
efi/arm*: Only register page tables when they exist
Pull x86 platform updates from Ingo Molnar:
"The main changes in this cycle were:
- Add "Jailhouse" hypervisor support (Jan Kiszka)
- Update DeviceTree support (Ivan Gorinov)
- Improve DMI date handling (Andy Shevchenko)"
* 'x86-platform-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/PCI: Fix a potential regression when using dmi_get_bios_year()
firmware/dmi_scan: Uninline dmi_get_bios_year() helper
x86/devicetree: Use CPU description from Device Tree
of/Documentation: Specify local APIC ID in "reg"
MAINTAINERS: Add entry for Jailhouse
x86/jailhouse: Allow to use PCI_MMCONFIG without ACPI
x86: Consolidate PCI_MMCONFIG configs
x86: Align x86_64 PCI_MMCONFIG with 32-bit variant
x86/jailhouse: Enable PCI mmconfig access in inmates
PCI: Scan all functions when running over Jailhouse
jailhouse: Provide detection for non-x86 systems
x86/devicetree: Fix device IRQ settings in DT
x86/devicetree: Initialize device tree before using it
pci: Simplify code by using the new dmi_get_bios_year() helper
ACPI/sleep: Simplify code by using the new dmi_get_bios_year() helper
x86/pci: Simplify code by using the new dmi_get_bios_year() helper
dmi: Introduce the dmi_get_bios_year() helper function
x86/platform/quark: Re-use DEFINE_SHOW_ATTRIBUTE() macro
x86/platform/atom: Re-use DEFINE_SHOW_ATTRIBUTE() macro
Pull x86 mm updates from Ingo Molnar:
- Extend the memmap= boot parameter syntax to allow the redeclaration
and dropping of existing ranges, and to support all e820 range types
(Jan H. Schönherr)
- Improve the W+X boot time security checks to remove false positive
warnings on Xen (Jan Beulich)
- Support booting as Xen PVH guest (Juergen Gross)
- Improved 5-level paging (LA57) support, in particular it's possible
now to have a single kernel image for both 4-level and 5-level
hardware (Kirill A. Shutemov)
- AMD hardware RAM encryption support (SME/SEV) fixes (Tom Lendacky)
- Preparatory commits for hardware-encrypted RAM support on Intel CPUs.
(Kirill A. Shutemov)
- Improved Intel-MID support (Andy Shevchenko)
- Show EFI page tables in page_tables debug files (Andy Lutomirski)
- ... plus misc fixes and smaller cleanups
* 'x86-mm-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (56 commits)
x86/cpu/tme: Fix spelling: "configuation" -> "configuration"
x86/boot: Fix SEV boot failure from change to __PHYSICAL_MASK_SHIFT
x86/mm: Update comment in detect_tme() regarding x86_phys_bits
x86/mm/32: Remove unused node_memmap_size_bytes() & CONFIG_NEED_NODE_MEMMAP_SIZE logic
x86/mm: Remove pointless checks in vmalloc_fault
x86/platform/intel-mid: Add special handling for ACPI HW reduced platforms
ACPI, x86/boot: Introduce the ->reduced_hw_early_init() ACPI callback
ACPI, x86/boot: Split out acpi_generic_reduce_hw_init() and export
x86/pconfig: Provide defines and helper to run MKTME_KEY_PROG leaf
x86/pconfig: Detect PCONFIG targets
x86/tme: Detect if TME and MKTME is activated by BIOS
x86/boot/compressed/64: Handle 5-level paging boot if kernel is above 4G
x86/boot/compressed/64: Use page table in trampoline memory
x86/boot/compressed/64: Use stack from trampoline memory
x86/boot/compressed/64: Make sure we have a 32-bit code segment
x86/mm: Do not use paravirtualized calls in native_set_p4d()
kdump, vmcoreinfo: Export pgtable_l5_enabled value
x86/boot/compressed/64: Prepare new top-level page table for trampoline
x86/boot/compressed/64: Set up trampoline memory
x86/boot/compressed/64: Save and restore trampoline memory
...
Pull x86 and PTI fixes from Ingo Molnar:
"Misc fixes:
- fix EFI pagetables freeing
- fix vsyscall pagetable setting on Xen PV guests
- remove ancient CONFIG_X86_PPRO_FENCE=y - x86 is TSO again
- fix two binutils (ld) development version related incompatibilities
- clean up breakpoint handling
- fix an x86 self-test"
* 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/entry/64: Don't use IST entry for #BP stack
x86/efi: Free efi_pgd with free_pages()
x86/vsyscall/64: Use proper accessor to update P4D entry
x86/cpu: Remove the CONFIG_X86_PPRO_FENCE=y quirk
x86/boot/64: Verify alignment of the LOAD segment
x86/build/64: Force the linker to use 2MB page size
selftests/x86/ptrace_syscall: Fix for yet more glibc interference
