Merge "Merge android-4.19-q.66 (5118163) into msm-4.19"

Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst

@@ -41,10 +41,11 @@ Related CVEs
 
 The following CVE entries describe Spectre variants:
 
-   =============   =======================  =================
+   =============   =======================  ==========================
    CVE-2017-5753   Bounds check bypass      Spectre variant 1
    CVE-2017-5715   Branch target injection  Spectre variant 2
-   =============   =======================  =================
+   CVE-2019-1125   Spectre v1 swapgs        Spectre variant 1 (swapgs)
+   =============   =======================  ==========================
 
 Problem
 -------
@@ -78,6 +79,13 @@ There are some extensions of Spectre variant 1 attacks for reading data
 over the network, see :ref:`[12] <spec_ref12>`. However such attacks
 are difficult, low bandwidth, fragile, and are considered low risk.
 
+Note that, despite "Bounds Check Bypass" name, Spectre variant 1 is not
+only about user-controlled array bounds checks.  It can affect any
+conditional checks.  The kernel entry code interrupt, exception, and NMI
+handlers all have conditional swapgs checks.  Those may be problematic
+in the context of Spectre v1, as kernel code can speculatively run with
+a user GS.
+
 Spectre variant 2 (Branch Target Injection)
 -------------------------------------------
 
@@ -132,6 +140,9 @@ not cover all possible attack vectors.
 1. A user process attacking the kernel
 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
 
+Spectre variant 1
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
    The attacker passes a parameter to the kernel via a register or
    via a known address in memory during a syscall. Such parameter may
    be used later by the kernel as an index to an array or to derive
@@ -144,7 +155,40 @@ not cover all possible attack vectors.
    potentially be influenced for Spectre attacks, new "nospec" accessor
    macros are used to prevent speculative loading of data.
 
-   Spectre variant 2 attacker can :ref:`poison <poison_btb>` the branch
+Spectre variant 1 (swapgs)
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+   An attacker can train the branch predictor to speculatively skip the
+   swapgs path for an interrupt or exception.  If they initialize
+   the GS register to a user-space value, if the swapgs is speculatively
+   skipped, subsequent GS-related percpu accesses in the speculation
+   window will be done with the attacker-controlled GS value.  This
+   could cause privileged memory to be accessed and leaked.
+
+   For example:
+
+   ::
+
+     if (coming from user space)
+         swapgs
+     mov %gs:<percpu_offset>, %reg
+     mov (%reg), %reg1
+
+   When coming from user space, the CPU can speculatively skip the
+   swapgs, and then do a speculative percpu load using the user GS
+   value.  So the user can speculatively force a read of any kernel
+   value.  If a gadget exists which uses the percpu value as an address
+   in another load/store, then the contents of the kernel value may
+   become visible via an L1 side channel attack.
+
+   A similar attack exists when coming from kernel space.  The CPU can
+   speculatively do the swapgs, causing the user GS to get used for the
+   rest of the speculative window.
+
+Spectre variant 2
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+   A spectre variant 2 attacker can :ref:`poison <poison_btb>` the branch
    target buffer (BTB) before issuing syscall to launch an attack.
    After entering the kernel, the kernel could use the poisoned branch
    target buffer on indirect jump and jump to gadget code in speculative
@@ -280,11 +324,18 @@ The sysfs file showing Spectre variant 1 mitigation status is:
 
 The possible values in this file are:
 
-  =======================================  =================================
-  'Mitigation: __user pointer sanitation'  Protection in kernel on a case by
-                                           case base with explicit pointer
-                                           sanitation.
-  =======================================  =================================
+  .. list-table::
+
+     * - 'Not affected'
+       - The processor is not vulnerable.
+     * - 'Vulnerable: __user pointer sanitization and usercopy barriers only; no swapgs barriers'
+       - The swapgs protections are disabled; otherwise it has
+         protection in the kernel on a case by case base with explicit
+         pointer sanitation and usercopy LFENCE barriers.
+     * - 'Mitigation: usercopy/swapgs barriers and __user pointer sanitization'
+       - Protection in the kernel on a case by case base with explicit
+         pointer sanitation, usercopy LFENCE barriers, and swapgs LFENCE
+         barriers.
 
 However, the protections are put in place on a case by case basis,
 and there is no guarantee that all possible attack vectors for Spectre
@@ -366,12 +417,27 @@ Turning on mitigation for Spectre variant 1 and Spectre variant 2
 1. Kernel mitigation
 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
 
+Spectre variant 1
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
    For the Spectre variant 1, vulnerable kernel code (as determined
    by code audit or scanning tools) is annotated on a case by case
    basis to use nospec accessor macros for bounds clipping :ref:`[2]
    <spec_ref2>` to avoid any usable disclosure gadgets. However, it may
    not cover all attack vectors for Spectre variant 1.
 
+   Copy-from-user code has an LFENCE barrier to prevent the access_ok()
+   check from being mis-speculated.  The barrier is done by the
+   barrier_nospec() macro.
+
+   For the swapgs variant of Spectre variant 1, LFENCE barriers are
+   added to interrupt, exception and NMI entry where needed.  These
+   barriers are done by the FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY and
+   FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY macros.
+
+Spectre variant 2
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
    For Spectre variant 2 mitigation, the compiler turns indirect calls or
    jumps in the kernel into equivalent return trampolines (retpolines)
    :ref:`[3] <spec_ref3>` :ref:`[9] <spec_ref9>` to go to the target
@@ -473,6 +539,12 @@ Mitigation control on the kernel command line
 Spectre variant 2 mitigation can be disabled or force enabled at the
 kernel command line.
 
+	nospectre_v1
+
+		[X86,PPC] Disable mitigations for Spectre Variant 1
+		(bounds check bypass). With this option data leaks are
+		possible in the system.
+
 	nospectre_v2
 
 		[X86] Disable all mitigations for the Spectre variant 2

Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt

@@ -2522,6 +2522,7 @@
 				Equivalent to: nopti [X86,PPC]
 					       nospectre_v1 [PPC]
 					       nobp=0 [S390]
+					       nospectre_v1 [X86]
 					       nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC,S390]
 					       spectre_v2_user=off [X86]
 					       spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86,PPC]
@@ -2868,9 +2869,9 @@
 			nosmt=force: Force disable SMT, cannot be undone
 				     via the sysfs control file.
 
-	nospectre_v1	[PPC] Disable mitigations for Spectre Variant 1 (bounds
-			check bypass). With this option data leaks are possible
-			in the system.
+	nospectre_v1	[X66, PPC] Disable mitigations for Spectre Variant 1
+			(bounds check bypass). With this option data leaks
+			are possible in the system.
 
 	nospectre_v2	[X86,PPC_FSL_BOOK3E] Disable all mitigations for the Spectre variant 2
 			(indirect branch prediction) vulnerability. System may

Makefile

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
 VERSION = 4
 PATCHLEVEL = 19
-SUBLEVEL = 62
+SUBLEVEL = 66
 EXTRAVERSION =
 NAME = "People's Front"
 
@@ -434,6 +434,7 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS_MODULE  := -DMODULE
 KBUILD_LDFLAGS_MODULE := -T $(srctree)/scripts/module-common.lds
 KBUILD_LDFLAGS :=
 GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS :=
+CLANG_FLAGS :=
 
 export ARCH SRCARCH CONFIG_SHELL HOSTCC KBUILD_HOSTCFLAGS CROSS_COMPILE AS LD CC
 export CPP AR NM STRIP OBJCOPY OBJDUMP KBUILD_HOSTLDFLAGS KBUILD_HOSTLDLIBS
@@ -487,7 +488,7 @@ endif
 ifeq ($(cc-name),clang)
 ifneq ($(CROSS_COMPILE),)
 CLANG_TRIPLE	?= $(CROSS_COMPILE)
-CLANG_FLAGS	:= --target=$(notdir $(CLANG_TRIPLE:%-=%))
+CLANG_FLAGS	+= --target=$(notdir $(CLANG_TRIPLE:%-=%))
 ifeq ($(shell $(srctree)/scripts/clang-android.sh $(CC) $(CLANG_FLAGS)), y)
 $(error "Clang with Android --target detected. Did you specify CLANG_TRIPLE?")
 endif
@@ -499,6 +500,7 @@ ifneq ($(GCC_TOOLCHAIN),)
 CLANG_FLAGS	+= --gcc-toolchain=$(GCC_TOOLCHAIN)
 endif
 CLANG_FLAGS	+= -no-integrated-as
+CLANG_FLAGS	+= -Werror=unknown-warning-option
 KBUILD_CFLAGS	+= $(CLANG_FLAGS)
 KBUILD_AFLAGS	+= $(CLANG_FLAGS)
 export CLANG_FLAGS

arch/arc/Kconfig

@@ -199,7 +199,6 @@ config NR_CPUS
 
 config ARC_SMP_HALT_ON_RESET
 	bool "Enable Halt-on-reset boot mode"
-	default y if ARC_UBOOT_SUPPORT
 	help
 	  In SMP configuration cores can be configured as Halt-on-reset
 	  or they could all start at same time. For Halt-on-reset, non
@@ -539,18 +538,6 @@ config ARC_DBG_TLB_PARANOIA
 
 endif
 
-config ARC_UBOOT_SUPPORT
-	bool "Support uboot arg Handling"
-	default n
-	help
-	  ARC Linux by default checks for uboot provided args as pointers to
-	  external cmdline or DTB. This however breaks in absence of uboot,
-	  when booting from Metaware debugger directly, as the registers are
-	  not zeroed out on reset by mdb and/or ARCv2 based cores. The bogus
-	  registers look like uboot args to kernel which then chokes.
-	  So only enable the uboot arg checking/processing if users are sure
-	  of uboot being in play.
-
 config ARC_BUILTIN_DTB_NAME
 	string "Built in DTB"
 	help

arch/arc/configs/nps_defconfig

@@ -31,7 +31,6 @@ CONFIG_ARC_CACHE_LINE_SHIFT=5
 # CONFIG_ARC_HAS_LLSC is not set
 CONFIG_ARC_KVADDR_SIZE=402
 CONFIG_ARC_EMUL_UNALIGNED=y
-CONFIG_ARC_UBOOT_SUPPORT=y
 CONFIG_PREEMPT=y
 CONFIG_NET=y
 CONFIG_UNIX=y

arch/arc/configs/vdk_hs38_defconfig

@@ -13,7 +13,6 @@ CONFIG_PARTITION_ADVANCED=y
 CONFIG_ARC_PLAT_AXS10X=y
 CONFIG_AXS103=y
 CONFIG_ISA_ARCV2=y
-CONFIG_ARC_UBOOT_SUPPORT=y
 CONFIG_ARC_BUILTIN_DTB_NAME="vdk_hs38"
 CONFIG_PREEMPT=y
 CONFIG_NET=y

arch/arc/configs/vdk_hs38_smp_defconfig

@@ -15,8 +15,6 @@ CONFIG_AXS103=y
 CONFIG_ISA_ARCV2=y
 CONFIG_SMP=y
 # CONFIG_ARC_TIMERS_64BIT is not set
-# CONFIG_ARC_SMP_HALT_ON_RESET is not set
-CONFIG_ARC_UBOOT_SUPPORT=y
 CONFIG_ARC_BUILTIN_DTB_NAME="vdk_hs38_smp"
 CONFIG_PREEMPT=y
 CONFIG_NET=y

arch/arc/kernel/head.S

@@ -100,7 +100,6 @@ ENTRY(stext)
 	st.ab   0, [r5, 4]
 1:
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_ARC_UBOOT_SUPPORT
 	; Uboot - kernel ABI
 	;    r0 = [0] No uboot interaction, [1] cmdline in r2, [2] DTB in r2
 	;    r1 = magic number (always zero as of now)
@@ -109,7 +108,6 @@ ENTRY(stext)
 	st	r0, [@uboot_tag]
 	st      r1, [@uboot_magic]
 	st	r2, [@uboot_arg]
-#endif
 
 	; setup "current" tsk and optionally cache it in dedicated r25
 	mov	r9, @init_task

arch/arc/kernel/setup.c

@@ -493,7 +493,6 @@ void __init handle_uboot_args(void)
 	bool use_embedded_dtb = true;
 	bool append_cmdline = false;
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_ARC_UBOOT_SUPPORT
 	/* check that we know this tag */
 	if (uboot_tag != UBOOT_TAG_NONE &&
 	    uboot_tag != UBOOT_TAG_CMDLINE &&
@@ -525,7 +524,6 @@ void __init handle_uboot_args(void)
 		append_cmdline = true;
 
 ignore_uboot_args:
-#endif
 
 	if (use_embedded_dtb) {
 		machine_desc = setup_machine_fdt(__dtb_start);

arch/arm/boot/dts/rk3288-veyron-mickey.dts

@@ -124,10 +124,6 @@
 	};
 };
 
-&emmc {
-	/delete-property/mmc-hs200-1_8v;
-};
-
 &i2c2 {
 	status = "disabled";
 };

arch/arm/boot/dts/rk3288-veyron-minnie.dts

@@ -90,10 +90,6 @@
 	pwm-off-delay-ms = <200>;
 };
 
-&emmc {
-	/delete-property/mmc-hs200-1_8v;
-};
-
 &gpio_keys {
 	pinctrl-0 = <&pwr_key_l &ap_lid_int_l &volum_down_l &volum_up_l>;
 

arch/arm/boot/dts/rk3288.dtsi

@@ -227,6 +227,7 @@
 			     <GIC_PPI 11 (GIC_CPU_MASK_SIMPLE(4) | IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH)>,
 			     <GIC_PPI 10 (GIC_CPU_MASK_SIMPLE(4) | IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH)>;
 		clock-frequency = <24000000>;
+		arm,no-tick-in-suspend;
 	};
 
 	timer: timer@ff810000 {

arch/arm/mach-rpc/dma.c

@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ static irqreturn_t iomd_dma_handle(int irq, void *dev_id)
 	} while (1);
 
 	idma->state = ~DMA_ST_AB;
-	disable_irq(irq);
+	disable_irq_nosync(irq);
 
 	return IRQ_HANDLED;
 }
@@ -174,6 +174,9 @@ static void iomd_enable_dma(unsigned int chan, dma_t *dma)
 				DMA_FROM_DEVICE : DMA_TO_DEVICE);
 		}
 
+		idma->dma_addr = idma->dma.sg->dma_address;
+		idma->dma_len = idma->dma.sg->length;
+
 		iomd_writeb(DMA_CR_C, dma_base + CR);
 		idma->state = DMA_ST_AB;
 	}

arch/arm64/boot/dts/rockchip/rk3399.dtsi

@@ -1643,11 +1643,11 @@
 		reg = <0x0 0xff914000 0x0 0x100>, <0x0 0xff915000 0x0 0x100>;
 		interrupts = <GIC_SPI 43 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH 0>;
 		interrupt-names = "isp0_mmu";
-		clocks = <&cru ACLK_ISP0_NOC>, <&cru HCLK_ISP0_NOC>;
+		clocks = <&cru ACLK_ISP0_WRAPPER>, <&cru HCLK_ISP0_WRAPPER>;
 		clock-names = "aclk", "iface";
 		#iommu-cells = <0>;
+		power-domains = <&power RK3399_PD_ISP0>;
 		rockchip,disable-mmu-reset;
-		status = "disabled";
 	};
 
 	isp1_mmu: iommu@ff924000 {
@@ -1655,11 +1655,11 @@
 		reg = <0x0 0xff924000 0x0 0x100>, <0x0 0xff925000 0x0 0x100>;
 		interrupts = <GIC_SPI 44 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH 0>;
 		interrupt-names = "isp1_mmu";
-		clocks = <&cru ACLK_ISP1_NOC>, <&cru HCLK_ISP1_NOC>;
+		clocks = <&cru ACLK_ISP1_WRAPPER>, <&cru HCLK_ISP1_WRAPPER>;
 		clock-names = "aclk", "iface";
 		#iommu-cells = <0>;
+		power-domains = <&power RK3399_PD_ISP1>;
 		rockchip,disable-mmu-reset;
-		status = "disabled";
 	};
 
 	hdmi_sound: hdmi-sound {

arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h

@@ -124,7 +124,11 @@
  * RAS Error Synchronization barrier
  */
 	.macro  esb
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_RAS_EXTN
 	hint    #16
+#else
+	nop
+#endif
 	.endm
 
 /*

arch/arm64/include/asm/compat.h

@@ -159,6 +159,7 @@ static inline compat_uptr_t ptr_to_compat(void __user *uptr)
 }
 
 #define compat_user_stack_pointer() (user_stack_pointer(task_pt_regs(current)))
+#define COMPAT_MINSIGSTKSZ	2048
 
 static inline void __user *arch_compat_alloc_user_space(long len)
 {

arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h

@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ enum ftr_type {
 	FTR_EXACT,			/* Use a predefined safe value */
 	FTR_LOWER_SAFE,			/* Smaller value is safe */
 	FTR_HIGHER_SAFE,		/* Bigger value is safe */
+	FTR_HIGHER_OR_ZERO_SAFE,	/* Bigger value is safe, but 0 is biggest */
 };
 
 #define FTR_STRICT	true	/* SANITY check strict matching required */

arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c

@@ -211,8 +211,8 @@ static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_ctr[] = {
 	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, 31, 1, 1), /* RES1 */
 	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, CTR_DIC_SHIFT, 1, 1),
 	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, CTR_IDC_SHIFT, 1, 1),
-	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_HIGHER_SAFE, CTR_CWG_SHIFT, 4, 0),
-	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_HIGHER_SAFE, CTR_ERG_SHIFT, 4, 0),
+	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_HIGHER_OR_ZERO_SAFE, CTR_CWG_SHIFT, 4, 0),
+	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_HIGHER_OR_ZERO_SAFE, CTR_ERG_SHIFT, 4, 0),
 	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, CTR_DMINLINE_SHIFT, 4, 1),
 	/*
 	 * Linux can handle differing I-cache policies. Userspace JITs will
@@ -454,6 +454,10 @@ static s64 arm64_ftr_safe_value(const struct arm64_ftr_bits *ftrp, s64 new,
 	case FTR_LOWER_SAFE:
 		ret = new < cur ? new : cur;
 		break;
+	case FTR_HIGHER_OR_ZERO_SAFE:
+		if (!cur || !new)
+			break;
+		/* Fallthrough */
 	case FTR_HIGHER_SAFE:
 		ret = new > cur ? new : cur;
 		break;

arch/arm64/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c

@@ -547,13 +547,14 @@ int hw_breakpoint_arch_parse(struct perf_event *bp,
 			/* Aligned */
 			break;
 		case 1:
-			/* Allow single byte watchpoint. */
-			if (hw->ctrl.len == ARM_BREAKPOINT_LEN_1)
-				break;
 		case 2:
 			/* Allow halfword watchpoints and breakpoints. */
 			if (hw->ctrl.len == ARM_BREAKPOINT_LEN_2)
 				break;
+		case 3:
+			/* Allow single byte watchpoint. */
+			if (hw->ctrl.len == ARM_BREAKPOINT_LEN_1)
+				break;
 		default:
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}

arch/mips/lantiq/irq.c

@@ -156,8 +156,9 @@ static int ltq_eiu_settype(struct irq_data *d, unsigned int type)
 			if (edge)
 				irq_set_handler(d->hwirq, handle_edge_irq);
 
-			ltq_eiu_w32(ltq_eiu_r32(LTQ_EIU_EXIN_C) |
-				(val << (i * 4)), LTQ_EIU_EXIN_C);
+			ltq_eiu_w32((ltq_eiu_r32(LTQ_EIU_EXIN_C) &
+				    (~(7 << (i * 4)))) | (val << (i * 4)),
+				    LTQ_EIU_EXIN_C);
 		}
 	}
 

arch/parisc/boot/compressed/vmlinux.lds.S

@@ -42,8 +42,8 @@ SECTIONS
 #endif
 	_startcode_end = .;
 
-	/* bootloader code and data starts behind area of extracted kernel */
-	. = (SZ_end - SZparisc_kernel_start + KERNEL_BINARY_TEXT_START);
+	/* bootloader code and data starts at least behind area of extracted kernel */
+	. = MAX(ABSOLUTE(.), (SZ_end - SZparisc_kernel_start + KERNEL_BINARY_TEXT_START));
 
 	/* align on next page boundary */
 	. = ALIGN(4096);

arch/powerpc/boot/xz_config.h

@@ -20,10 +20,30 @@ static inline uint32_t swab32p(void *p)
 
 #ifdef __LITTLE_ENDIAN__
 #define get_le32(p) (*((uint32_t *) (p)))
+#define cpu_to_be32(x) swab32(x)
+static inline u32 be32_to_cpup(const u32 *p)
+{
+	return swab32p((u32 *)p);
+}
 #else
 #define get_le32(p) swab32p(p)
+#define cpu_to_be32(x) (x)
+static inline u32 be32_to_cpup(const u32 *p)
+{
+	return *p;
+}
 #endif
 
+static inline uint32_t get_unaligned_be32(const void *p)
+{
+	return be32_to_cpup(p);
+}
+
+static inline void put_unaligned_be32(u32 val, void *p)
+{
+	*((u32 *)p) = cpu_to_be32(val);
+}
+
 #define memeq(a, b, size) (memcmp(a, b, size) == 0)
 #define memzero(buf, size) memset(buf, 0, size)
 

arch/powerpc/include/asm/cacheflush.h

@@ -32,9 +32,12 @@
  * not expect this type of fault. flush_cache_vmap is not exactly the right
  * place to put this, but it seems to work well enough.
  */
-#define flush_cache_vmap(start, end)		do { asm volatile("ptesync" ::: "memory"); } while (0)
+static inline void flush_cache_vmap(unsigned long start, unsigned long end)
+{
+	asm volatile("ptesync" ::: "memory");
+}
 #else
-#define flush_cache_vmap(start, end)		do { } while (0)
+static inline void flush_cache_vmap(unsigned long start, unsigned long end) { }
 #endif
 
 #define ARCH_IMPLEMENTS_FLUSH_DCACHE_PAGE 1

arch/powerpc/kernel/eeh.c

@@ -360,10 +360,19 @@ static inline unsigned long eeh_token_to_phys(unsigned long token)
 	ptep = find_init_mm_pte(token, &hugepage_shift);
 	if (!ptep)
 		return token;
-	WARN_ON(hugepage_shift);
-	pa = pte_pfn(*ptep) << PAGE_SHIFT;
 
-	return pa | (token & (PAGE_SIZE-1));
+	pa = pte_pfn(*ptep);
+
+	/* On radix we can do hugepage mappings for io, so handle that */
+	if (hugepage_shift) {
+		pa <<= hugepage_shift;
+		pa |= token & ((1ul << hugepage_shift) - 1);
+	} else {
+		pa <<= PAGE_SHIFT;
+		pa |= token & (PAGE_SIZE - 1);
+	}
+
+	return pa;
 }
 
 /*

arch/powerpc/kernel/pci_of_scan.c

@@ -45,6 +45,8 @@ unsigned int pci_parse_of_flags(u32 addr0, int bridge)
 	if (addr0 & 0x02000000) {
 		flags = IORESOURCE_MEM | PCI_BASE_ADDRESS_SPACE_MEMORY;
 		flags |= (addr0 >> 22) & PCI_BASE_ADDRESS_MEM_TYPE_64;
+		if (flags & PCI_BASE_ADDRESS_MEM_TYPE_64)
+			flags |= IORESOURCE_MEM_64;
 		flags |= (addr0 >> 28) & PCI_BASE_ADDRESS_MEM_TYPE_1M;
 		if (addr0 & 0x40000000)
 			flags |= IORESOURCE_PREFETCH

arch/powerpc/kernel/signal_32.c

@@ -1202,6 +1202,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE0(rt_sigreturn)
 			goto bad;
 
 		if (MSR_TM_ACTIVE(msr_hi<<32)) {
+			/* Trying to start TM on non TM system */
+			if (!cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_TM))
+				goto bad;
 			/* We only recheckpoint on return if we're
 			 * transaction.
 			 */

arch/powerpc/kernel/signal_64.c

@@ -750,6 +750,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE0(rt_sigreturn)
 	if (MSR_TM_ACTIVE(msr)) {
 		/* We recheckpoint on return. */
 		struct ucontext __user *uc_transact;
+
+		/* Trying to start TM on non TM system */
+		if (!cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_TM))
+			goto badframe;
+
 		if (__get_user(uc_transact, &uc->uc_link))
 			goto badframe;
 		if (restore_tm_sigcontexts(current, &uc->uc_mcontext,

arch/powerpc/mm/hugetlbpage.c

@@ -150,6 +150,8 @@ pte_t *huge_pte_alloc(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr, unsigned long sz
 	} else {
 		pdshift = PUD_SHIFT;
 		pu = pud_alloc(mm, pg, addr);
+		if (!pu)
+			return NULL;
 		if (pshift == PUD_SHIFT)
 			return (pte_t *)pu;
 		else if (pshift > PMD_SHIFT) {
@@ -158,6 +160,8 @@ pte_t *huge_pte_alloc(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr, unsigned long sz
 		} else {
 			pdshift = PMD_SHIFT;
 			pm = pmd_alloc(mm, pu, addr);
+			if (!pm)
+				return NULL;
 			if (pshift == PMD_SHIFT)
 				/* 16MB hugepage */
 				return (pte_t *)pm;
@@ -174,12 +178,16 @@ pte_t *huge_pte_alloc(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr, unsigned long sz
 	} else {
 		pdshift = PUD_SHIFT;
 		pu = pud_alloc(mm, pg, addr);
+		if (!pu)
+			return NULL;
 		if (pshift >= PUD_SHIFT) {
 			ptl = pud_lockptr(mm, pu);
 			hpdp = (hugepd_t *)pu;
 		} else {
 			pdshift = PMD_SHIFT;
 			pm = pmd_alloc(mm, pu, addr);
+			if (!pm)
+				return NULL;
 			ptl = pmd_lockptr(mm, pm);
 			hpdp = (hugepd_t *)pm;
 		}

arch/powerpc/platforms/4xx/uic.c

@@ -158,6 +158,7 @@ static int uic_set_irq_type(struct irq_data *d, unsigned int flow_type)
 
 	mtdcr(uic->dcrbase + UIC_PR, pr);
 	mtdcr(uic->dcrbase + UIC_TR, tr);
+	mtdcr(uic->dcrbase + UIC_SR, ~mask);
 
 	raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&uic->lock, flags);
 

arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/mobility.c

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
  * 2 as published by the Free Software Foundation.
  */
 
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
 #include <linux/kobject.h>
 #include <linux/smp.h>
@@ -344,11 +345,19 @@ void post_mobility_fixup(void)
 	if (rc)
 		printk(KERN_ERR "Post-mobility activate-fw failed: %d\n", rc);
 
+	/*
+	 * We don't want CPUs to go online/offline while the device
+	 * tree is being updated.
+	 */
+	cpus_read_lock();
+
 	rc = pseries_devicetree_update(MIGRATION_SCOPE);
 	if (rc)
 		printk(KERN_ERR "Post-mobility device tree update "
 			"failed: %d\n", rc);
 
+	cpus_read_unlock();
+
 	/* Possibly switch to a new RFI flush type */
 	pseries_setup_rfi_flush();
 

arch/powerpc/sysdev/xive/common.c

@@ -483,7 +483,7 @@ static int xive_find_target_in_mask(const struct cpumask *mask,
 	 * Now go through the entire mask until we find a valid
 	 * target.
 	 */
-	for (;;) {
+	do {
 		/*
 		 * We re-check online as the fallback case passes us
 		 * an untested affinity mask
@@ -491,12 +491,11 @@ static int xive_find_target_in_mask(const struct cpumask *mask,
 		if (cpu_online(cpu) && xive_try_pick_target(cpu))
 			return cpu;
 		cpu = cpumask_next(cpu, mask);
-		if (cpu == first)
-			break;
 		/* Wrap around */
 		if (cpu >= nr_cpu_ids)
 			cpu = cpumask_first(mask);
-	}
+	} while (cpu != first);
+
 	return -1;
 }
 

arch/powerpc/xmon/xmon.c

@@ -466,8 +466,10 @@ static int xmon_core(struct pt_regs *regs, int fromipi)
 	local_irq_save(flags);
 	hard_irq_disable();
 
+	if (!fromipi) {
 		tracing_enabled = tracing_is_on();
 		tracing_off();
+	}
 
 	bp = in_breakpoint_table(regs->nip, &offset);
 	if (bp != NULL) {

arch/sh/boards/Kconfig

@@ -8,27 +8,19 @@ config SH_ALPHA_BOARD
 	bool
 
 config SH_DEVICE_TREE
-	bool "Board Described by Device Tree"
+	bool
 	select OF
 	select OF_EARLY_FLATTREE
 	select TIMER_OF
 	select COMMON_CLK
 	select GENERIC_CALIBRATE_DELAY
-	help
-	  Select Board Described by Device Tree to build a kernel that
-	  does not hard-code any board-specific knowledge but instead uses
-	  a device tree blob provided by the boot-loader. You must enable
-	  drivers for any hardware you want to use separately. At this
-	  time, only boards based on the open-hardware J-Core processors
-	  have sufficient driver coverage to use this option; do not
-	  select it if you are using original SuperH hardware.
 
 config SH_JCORE_SOC
 	bool "J-Core SoC"
-	depends on SH_DEVICE_TREE && (CPU_SH2 || CPU_J2)
+	select SH_DEVICE_TREE
 	select CLKSRC_JCORE_PIT
 	select JCORE_AIC
-	default y if CPU_J2
+	depends on CPU_J2
 	help
 	  Select this option to include drivers core components of the
 	  J-Core SoC, including interrupt controllers and timers.

arch/sh/include/asm/io.h

@@ -371,7 +371,11 @@ static inline int iounmap_fixed(void __iomem *addr) { return -EINVAL; }
 
 #define ioremap_nocache	ioremap
 #define ioremap_uc	ioremap
-#define iounmap		__iounmap
+
+static inline void iounmap(void __iomem *addr)
+{
+	__iounmap(addr);
+}
 
 /*
  * Convert a physical pointer to a virtual kernel pointer for /dev/mem

arch/um/include/asm/mmu_context.h

@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ static inline void activate_mm(struct mm_struct *old, struct mm_struct *new)
 	 * when the new ->mm is used for the first time.
 	 */
 	__switch_mm(&new->context.id);
-	down_write(&new->mmap_sem);
+	down_write_nested(&new->mmap_sem, 1);
 	uml_setup_stubs(new);
 	up_write(&new->mmap_sem);
 }

arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
 #include "pgtable.h"
 #include "../string.h"
 #include "../voffset.h"
+#include <asm/bootparam_utils.h>
 
 /*
  * WARNING!!

arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h

@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@
 #include <asm/page.h>
 #include <asm/boot.h>
 #include <asm/bootparam.h>
-#include <asm/bootparam_utils.h>
 
 #define BOOT_BOOT_H
 #include "../ctype.h"

arch/x86/entry/calling.h

@@ -329,6 +329,23 @@ For 32-bit we have the following conventions - kernel is built with
 
 #endif
 
+/*
+ * Mitigate Spectre v1 for conditional swapgs code paths.
+ *
+ * FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY is used in the user entry swapgs code path, to
+ * prevent a speculative swapgs when coming from kernel space.
+ *
+ * FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY is used in the kernel entry non-swapgs code path,
+ * to prevent the swapgs from getting speculatively skipped when coming from
+ * user space.
+ */
+.macro FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY
+	ALTERNATIVE "", "lfence", X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_USER
+.endm
+.macro FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY
+	ALTERNATIVE "", "lfence", X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL
+.endm
+
 #endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
 
 /*

arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S

@@ -582,7 +582,7 @@ ENTRY(interrupt_entry)
 	testb	$3, CS-ORIG_RAX+8(%rsp)
 	jz	1f
 	SWAPGS
-
+	FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY
 	/*
 	 * Switch to the thread stack. The IRET frame and orig_ax are
 	 * on the stack, as well as the return address. RDI..R12 are
@@ -612,8 +612,10 @@ ENTRY(interrupt_entry)
 	UNWIND_HINT_FUNC
 
 	movq	(%rdi), %rdi
+	jmp	2f
 1:
-
+	FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY
+2:
 	PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS save_ret=1
 	ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER 8
 
@@ -1196,7 +1198,6 @@ idtentry stack_segment		do_stack_segment	has_error_code=1
 #ifdef CONFIG_XEN
 idtentry xennmi			do_nmi			has_error_code=0
 idtentry xendebug		do_debug		has_error_code=0
-idtentry xenint3		do_int3			has_error_code=0
 #endif
 
 idtentry general_protection	do_general_protection	has_error_code=1
@@ -1241,6 +1242,13 @@ ENTRY(paranoid_entry)
 	 */
 	SAVE_AND_SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rax save_reg=%r14
 
+	/*
+	 * The above SAVE_AND_SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 macro doesn't do an
+	 * unconditional CR3 write, even in the PTI case.  So do an lfence
+	 * to prevent GS speculation, regardless of whether PTI is enabled.
+	 */
+	FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY
+
 	ret
 END(paranoid_entry)
 
@@ -1291,6 +1299,7 @@ ENTRY(error_entry)
 	 * from user mode due to an IRET fault.
 	 */
 	SWAPGS
+	FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY
 	/* We have user CR3.  Change to kernel CR3. */
 	SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rax
 
@@ -1312,6 +1321,8 @@ ENTRY(error_entry)
 	CALL_enter_from_user_mode
 	ret
 
+.Lerror_entry_done_lfence:
+	FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY
 .Lerror_entry_done:
 	TRACE_IRQS_OFF
 	ret
@@ -1330,7 +1341,7 @@ ENTRY(error_entry)
 	cmpq	%rax, RIP+8(%rsp)
 	je	.Lbstep_iret
 	cmpq	$.Lgs_change, RIP+8(%rsp)
-	jne	.Lerror_entry_done
+	jne	.Lerror_entry_done_lfence
 
 	/*
 	 * hack: .Lgs_change can fail with user gsbase.  If this happens, fix up
@@ -1338,6 +1349,7 @@ ENTRY(error_entry)
 	 * .Lgs_change's error handler with kernel gsbase.
 	 */
 	SWAPGS
+	FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY
 	SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rax
 	jmp .Lerror_entry_done
 
@@ -1352,6 +1364,7 @@ ENTRY(error_entry)
 	 * gsbase and CR3.  Switch to kernel gsbase and CR3:
 	 */
 	SWAPGS
+	FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY
 	SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rax
 
 	/*
@@ -1443,6 +1456,7 @@ ENTRY(nmi)
 
 	swapgs
 	cld
+	FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY
 	SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rdx
 	movq	%rsp, %rdx
 	movq	PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_current_top_of_stack), %rsp

arch/x86/entry/vdso/vclock_gettime.c

@@ -29,12 +29,12 @@ extern int __vdso_gettimeofday(struct timeval *tv, struct timezone *tz);
 extern time_t __vdso_time(time_t *t);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_PARAVIRT_CLOCK
-extern u8 pvclock_page
+extern u8 pvclock_page[PAGE_SIZE]
 	__attribute__((visibility("hidden")));
 #endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_HYPERV_TSCPAGE
-extern u8 hvclock_page
+extern u8 hvclock_page[PAGE_SIZE]
 	__attribute__((visibility("hidden")));
 #endif
 
@@ -191,13 +191,24 @@ notrace static inline u64 vgetsns(int *mode)
 
 	if (gtod->vclock_mode == VCLOCK_TSC)
 		cycles = vread_tsc();
+
+	/*
+	 * For any memory-mapped vclock type, we need to make sure that gcc
+	 * doesn't cleverly hoist a load before the mode check.  Otherwise we
+	 * might end up touching the memory-mapped page even if the vclock in
+	 * question isn't enabled, which will segfault.  Hence the barriers.
+	 */
 #ifdef CONFIG_PARAVIRT_CLOCK
-	else if (gtod->vclock_mode == VCLOCK_PVCLOCK)
+	else if (gtod->vclock_mode == VCLOCK_PVCLOCK) {
+		barrier();
 		cycles = vread_pvclock(mode);
+	}
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_HYPERV_TSCPAGE
-	else if (gtod->vclock_mode == VCLOCK_HVCLOCK)
+	else if (gtod->vclock_mode == VCLOCK_HVCLOCK) {
+		barrier();
 		cycles = vread_hvclock(mode);
+	}
 #endif
 	else
 		return 0;

arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h

@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ static inline void generic_apic_probe(void)
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC
 
-extern unsigned int apic_verbosity;
+extern int apic_verbosity;
 extern int local_apic_timer_c2_ok;
 
 extern int disable_apic;

arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h

@@ -22,8 +22,8 @@ enum cpuid_leafs
 	CPUID_LNX_3,
 	CPUID_7_0_EBX,
 	CPUID_D_1_EAX,
-	CPUID_F_0_EDX,
-	CPUID_F_1_EDX,
+	CPUID_LNX_4,
+	CPUID_DUMMY,
 	CPUID_8000_0008_EBX,
 	CPUID_6_EAX,
 	CPUID_8000_000A_EDX,

arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h

@@ -271,13 +271,18 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_XGETBV1		(10*32+ 2) /* XGETBV with ECX = 1 instruction */
 #define X86_FEATURE_XSAVES		(10*32+ 3) /* XSAVES/XRSTORS instructions */
 
-/* Intel-defined CPU QoS Sub-leaf, CPUID level 0x0000000F:0 (EDX), word 11 */
-#define X86_FEATURE_CQM_LLC		(11*32+ 1) /* LLC QoS if 1 */
-
-/* Intel-defined CPU QoS Sub-leaf, CPUID level 0x0000000F:1 (EDX), word 12 */
-#define X86_FEATURE_CQM_OCCUP_LLC	(12*32+ 0) /* LLC occupancy monitoring */
-#define X86_FEATURE_CQM_MBM_TOTAL	(12*32+ 1) /* LLC Total MBM monitoring */
-#define X86_FEATURE_CQM_MBM_LOCAL	(12*32+ 2) /* LLC Local MBM monitoring */
+/*
+ * Extended auxiliary flags: Linux defined - for features scattered in various
+ * CPUID levels like 0xf, etc.
+ *
+ * Reuse free bits when adding new feature flags!
+ */
+#define X86_FEATURE_CQM_LLC		(11*32+ 0) /* LLC QoS if 1 */
+#define X86_FEATURE_CQM_OCCUP_LLC	(11*32+ 1) /* LLC occupancy monitoring */
+#define X86_FEATURE_CQM_MBM_TOTAL	(11*32+ 2) /* LLC Total MBM monitoring */
+#define X86_FEATURE_CQM_MBM_LOCAL	(11*32+ 3) /* LLC Local MBM monitoring */
+#define X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_USER	(11*32+ 4) /* "" LFENCE in user entry SWAPGS path */
+#define X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL	(11*32+ 5) /* "" LFENCE in kernel entry SWAPGS path */
 
 /* AMD-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x80000008 (EBX), word 13 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_CLZERO		(13*32+ 0) /* CLZERO instruction */
@@ -383,5 +388,6 @@
 #define X86_BUG_L1TF			X86_BUG(18) /* CPU is affected by L1 Terminal Fault */
 #define X86_BUG_MDS			X86_BUG(19) /* CPU is affected by Microarchitectural data sampling */
 #define X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY		X86_BUG(20) /* CPU is only affected by the  MSDBS variant of BUG_MDS */
+#define X86_BUG_SWAPGS			X86_BUG(21) /* CPU is affected by speculation through SWAPGS */
 
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */

arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h

@@ -1427,25 +1427,29 @@ enum {
 #define kvm_arch_vcpu_memslots_id(vcpu) ((vcpu)->arch.hflags & HF_SMM_MASK ? 1 : 0)
 #define kvm_memslots_for_spte_role(kvm, role) __kvm_memslots(kvm, (role).smm)
 
+asmlinkage void __noreturn kvm_spurious_fault(void);
+
 /*
  * Hardware virtualization extension instructions may fault if a
  * reboot turns off virtualization while processes are running.
- * Trap the fault and ignore the instruction if that happens.
+ * Usually after catching the fault we just panic; during reboot
+ * instead the instruction is ignored.
  */
-asmlinkage void kvm_spurious_fault(void);
-
 #define ____kvm_handle_fault_on_reboot(insn, cleanup_insn)		\
-	"666: " insn "\n\t" \
-	"668: \n\t"                           \
-	".pushsection .fixup, \"ax\" \n" \
+	"666: \n\t"							\
+	insn "\n\t"							\
+	"jmp	668f \n\t"						\
 	"667: \n\t"							\
+	"call	kvm_spurious_fault \n\t"				\
+	"668: \n\t"							\
+	".pushsection .fixup, \"ax\" \n\t"				\
+	"700: \n\t"							\
 	cleanup_insn "\n\t"						\
 	"cmpb	$0, kvm_rebooting\n\t"					\
-	"jne 668b \n\t"      		      \
-	__ASM_SIZE(push) " $666b \n\t"	      \
-	"jmp kvm_spurious_fault \n\t"	      \
+	"je	667b \n\t"						\
+	"jmp	668b \n\t"						\
 	".popsection \n\t"						\
-	_ASM_EXTABLE(666b, 667b)
+	_ASM_EXTABLE(666b, 700b)
 
 #define __kvm_handle_fault_on_reboot(insn)		\
 	____kvm_handle_fault_on_reboot(insn, "")

arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h

@@ -768,6 +768,7 @@ static __always_inline bool pv_vcpu_is_preempted(long cpu)
 	    PV_RESTORE_ALL_CALLER_REGS					\
 	    FRAME_END							\
 	    "ret;"							\
+	    ".size " PV_THUNK_NAME(func) ", .-" PV_THUNK_NAME(func) ";"	\
 	    ".popsection")
 
 /* Get a reference to a callee-save function */

arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h

@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ asmlinkage void simd_coprocessor_error(void);
 asmlinkage void xen_divide_error(void);
 asmlinkage void xen_xennmi(void);
 asmlinkage void xen_xendebug(void);
-asmlinkage void xen_xenint3(void);
+asmlinkage void xen_int3(void);
 asmlinkage void xen_overflow(void);
 asmlinkage void xen_bounds(void);
 asmlinkage void xen_invalid_op(void);

arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c

@@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(local_apic_timer_c2_ok);
 /*
  * Debug level, exported for io_apic.c
  */
-unsigned int apic_verbosity;
+int apic_verbosity;
 
 int pic_mode;
 

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c

@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
 #include <asm/e820/api.h>
 #include <asm/hypervisor.h>
 
+static void __init spectre_v1_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init ssb_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void);
@@ -96,17 +97,11 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
 	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP))
 		x86_spec_ctrl_mask |= SPEC_CTRL_STIBP;
 
-	/* Select the proper spectre mitigation before patching alternatives */
+	/* Select the proper CPU mitigations before patching alternatives: */
+	spectre_v1_select_mitigation();
 	spectre_v2_select_mitigation();
-
-	/*
-	 * Select proper mitigation for any exposure to the Speculative Store
-	 * Bypass vulnerability.
-	 */
 	ssb_select_mitigation();
-
 	l1tf_select_mitigation();
-
 	mds_select_mitigation();
 
 	arch_smt_update();
@@ -271,6 +266,98 @@ static int __init mds_cmdline(char *str)
 }
 early_param("mds", mds_cmdline);
 
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt)     "Spectre V1 : " fmt
+
+enum spectre_v1_mitigation {
+	SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_NONE,
+	SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_AUTO,
+};
+
+static enum spectre_v1_mitigation spectre_v1_mitigation __ro_after_init =
+	SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_AUTO;
+
+static const char * const spectre_v1_strings[] = {
+	[SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_NONE] = "Vulnerable: __user pointer sanitization and usercopy barriers only; no swapgs barriers",
+	[SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_AUTO] = "Mitigation: usercopy/swapgs barriers and __user pointer sanitization",
+};
+
+/*
+ * Does SMAP provide full mitigation against speculative kernel access to
+ * userspace?
+ */
+static bool smap_works_speculatively(void)
+{
+	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SMAP))
+		return false;
+
+	/*
+	 * On CPUs which are vulnerable to Meltdown, SMAP does not
+	 * prevent speculative access to user data in the L1 cache.
+	 * Consider SMAP to be non-functional as a mitigation on these
+	 * CPUs.
+	 */
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN))
+		return false;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+static void __init spectre_v1_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1) || cpu_mitigations_off()) {
+		spectre_v1_mitigation = SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_NONE;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (spectre_v1_mitigation == SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_AUTO) {
+		/*
+		 * With Spectre v1, a user can speculatively control either
+		 * path of a conditional swapgs with a user-controlled GS
+		 * value.  The mitigation is to add lfences to both code paths.
+		 *
+		 * If FSGSBASE is enabled, the user can put a kernel address in
+		 * GS, in which case SMAP provides no protection.
+		 *
+		 * [ NOTE: Don't check for X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE until the
+		 *	   FSGSBASE enablement patches have been merged. ]
+		 *
+		 * If FSGSBASE is disabled, the user can only put a user space
+		 * address in GS.  That makes an attack harder, but still
+		 * possible if there's no SMAP protection.
+		 */
+		if (!smap_works_speculatively()) {
+			/*
+			 * Mitigation can be provided from SWAPGS itself or
+			 * PTI as the CR3 write in the Meltdown mitigation
+			 * is serializing.
+			 *
+			 * If neither is there, mitigate with an LFENCE to
+			 * stop speculation through swapgs.
+			 */
+			if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SWAPGS) &&
+			    !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI))
+				setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_USER);
+
+			/*
+			 * Enable lfences in the kernel entry (non-swapgs)
+			 * paths, to prevent user entry from speculatively
+			 * skipping swapgs.
+			 */
+			setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL);
+		}
+	}
+
+	pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v1_strings[spectre_v1_mitigation]);
+}
+
+static int __init nospectre_v1_cmdline(char *str)
+{
+	spectre_v1_mitigation = SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_NONE;
+	return 0;
+}
+early_param("nospectre_v1", nospectre_v1_cmdline);
+
 #undef pr_fmt
 #define pr_fmt(fmt)     "Spectre V2 : " fmt
 
@@ -1196,7 +1283,7 @@ static ssize_t l1tf_show_state(char *buf)
 
 static ssize_t mds_show_state(char *buf)
 {
-	if (!hypervisor_is_type(X86_HYPER_NATIVE)) {
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) {
 		return sprintf(buf, "%s; SMT Host state unknown\n",
 			       mds_strings[mds_mitigation]);
 	}
@@ -1258,7 +1345,7 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr
 		break;
 
 	case X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1:
-		return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n");
+		return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", spectre_v1_strings[spectre_v1_mitigation]);
 
 	case X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2:
 		return sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled],

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c

@@ -808,6 +808,30 @@ static void init_speculation_control(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	}
 }
 
+static void init_cqm(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+	if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_CQM_LLC)) {
+		c->x86_cache_max_rmid  = -1;
+		c->x86_cache_occ_scale = -1;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/* will be overridden if occupancy monitoring exists */
+	c->x86_cache_max_rmid = cpuid_ebx(0xf);
+
+	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_CQM_OCCUP_LLC) ||
+	    cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_CQM_MBM_TOTAL) ||
+	    cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_CQM_MBM_LOCAL)) {
+		u32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
+
+		/* QoS sub-leaf, EAX=0Fh, ECX=1 */
+		cpuid_count(0xf, 1, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+
+		c->x86_cache_max_rmid  = ecx;
+		c->x86_cache_occ_scale = ebx;
+	}
+}
+
 void get_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 {
 	u32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
@@ -839,33 +863,6 @@ void get_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 		c->x86_capability[CPUID_D_1_EAX] = eax;
 	}
 
-	/* Additional Intel-defined flags: level 0x0000000F */
-	if (c->cpuid_level >= 0x0000000F) {
-
-		/* QoS sub-leaf, EAX=0Fh, ECX=0 */
-		cpuid_count(0x0000000F, 0, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
-		c->x86_capability[CPUID_F_0_EDX] = edx;
-
-		if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_CQM_LLC)) {
-			/* will be overridden if occupancy monitoring exists */
-			c->x86_cache_max_rmid = ebx;
-
-			/* QoS sub-leaf, EAX=0Fh, ECX=1 */
-			cpuid_count(0x0000000F, 1, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
-			c->x86_capability[CPUID_F_1_EDX] = edx;
-
-			if ((cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_CQM_OCCUP_LLC)) ||
-			      ((cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_CQM_MBM_TOTAL)) ||
-			       (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_CQM_MBM_LOCAL)))) {
-				c->x86_cache_max_rmid = ecx;
-				c->x86_cache_occ_scale = ebx;
-			}
-		} else {
-			c->x86_cache_max_rmid = -1;
-			c->x86_cache_occ_scale = -1;
-		}
-	}
-
 	/* AMD-defined flags: level 0x80000001 */
 	eax = cpuid_eax(0x80000000);
 	c->extended_cpuid_level = eax;
@@ -896,6 +893,7 @@ void get_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 
 	init_scattered_cpuid_features(c);
 	init_speculation_control(c);
+	init_cqm(c);
 
 	/*
 	 * Clear/Set all flags overridden by options, after probe.
@@ -954,6 +952,7 @@ static void identify_cpu_without_cpuid(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 #define NO_L1TF		BIT(3)
 #define NO_MDS		BIT(4)
 #define MSBDS_ONLY	BIT(5)
+#define NO_SWAPGS	BIT(6)
 
 #define VULNWL(_vendor, _family, _model, _whitelist)	\
 	{ X86_VENDOR_##_vendor, _family, _model, X86_FEATURE_ANY, _whitelist }
@@ -977,29 +976,37 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = {
 	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_BONNELL,		NO_SPECULATION),
 	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_BONNELL_MID,		NO_SPECULATION),
 
-	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT,		NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY),
-	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT_X,		NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY),
-	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT_MID,	NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY),
-	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_AIRMONT,		NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY),
-	VULNWL_INTEL(XEON_PHI_KNL,		NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY),
-	VULNWL_INTEL(XEON_PHI_KNM,		NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT,		NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT_X,		NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT_MID,	NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_AIRMONT,		NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(XEON_PHI_KNL,		NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(XEON_PHI_KNM,		NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS),
 
 	VULNWL_INTEL(CORE_YONAH,		NO_SSB),
 
-	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_AIRMONT_MID,		NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_AIRMONT_MID,		NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS),
 
-	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT,		NO_MDS | NO_L1TF),
-	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_X,		NO_MDS | NO_L1TF),
-	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS,	NO_MDS | NO_L1TF),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT,		NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_X,		NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS,	NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS),
+
+	/*
+	 * Technically, swapgs isn't serializing on AMD (despite it previously
+	 * being documented as such in the APM).  But according to AMD, %gs is
+	 * updated non-speculatively, and the issuing of %gs-relative memory
+	 * operands will be blocked until the %gs update completes, which is
+	 * good enough for our purposes.
+	 */
 
 	/* AMD Family 0xf - 0x12 */
-	VULNWL_AMD(0x0f,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS),
-	VULNWL_AMD(0x10,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS),
-	VULNWL_AMD(0x11,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS),
-	VULNWL_AMD(0x12,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS),
+	VULNWL_AMD(0x0f,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS),
+	VULNWL_AMD(0x10,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS),
+	VULNWL_AMD(0x11,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS),
+	VULNWL_AMD(0x12,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS),
 
 	/* FAMILY_ANY must be last, otherwise 0x0f - 0x12 matches won't work */
-	VULNWL_AMD(X86_FAMILY_ANY,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS),
+	VULNWL_AMD(X86_FAMILY_ANY,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS),
 	{}
 };
 
@@ -1036,6 +1043,9 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 			setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY);
 	}
 
+	if (!cpu_matches(NO_SWAPGS))
+		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SWAPGS);
+
 	if (cpu_matches(NO_MELTDOWN))
 		return;
 

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c

@@ -59,6 +59,9 @@ static const struct cpuid_dep cpuid_deps[] = {
 	{ X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4VNNIW,	X86_FEATURE_AVX512F   },
 	{ X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4FMAPS,	X86_FEATURE_AVX512F   },
 	{ X86_FEATURE_AVX512_VPOPCNTDQ, X86_FEATURE_AVX512F   },
+	{ X86_FEATURE_CQM_OCCUP_LLC,	X86_FEATURE_CQM_LLC   },
+	{ X86_FEATURE_CQM_MBM_TOTAL,	X86_FEATURE_CQM_LLC   },
+	{ X86_FEATURE_CQM_MBM_LOCAL,	X86_FEATURE_CQM_LLC   },
 	{}
 };
 

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c

@@ -21,6 +21,10 @@ struct cpuid_bit {
 static const struct cpuid_bit cpuid_bits[] = {
 	{ X86_FEATURE_APERFMPERF,       CPUID_ECX,  0, 0x00000006, 0 },
 	{ X86_FEATURE_EPB,		CPUID_ECX,  3, 0x00000006, 0 },
+	{ X86_FEATURE_CQM_LLC,		CPUID_EDX,  1, 0x0000000f, 0 },
+	{ X86_FEATURE_CQM_OCCUP_LLC,	CPUID_EDX,  0, 0x0000000f, 1 },
+	{ X86_FEATURE_CQM_MBM_TOTAL,	CPUID_EDX,  1, 0x0000000f, 1 },
+	{ X86_FEATURE_CQM_MBM_LOCAL,	CPUID_EDX,  2, 0x0000000f, 1 },
 	{ X86_FEATURE_CAT_L3,		CPUID_EBX,  1, 0x00000010, 0 },
 	{ X86_FEATURE_CAT_L2,		CPUID_EBX,  2, 0x00000010, 0 },
 	{ X86_FEATURE_CDP_L3,		CPUID_ECX,  2, 0x00000010, 1 },

arch/x86/kernel/kvm.c

@@ -830,6 +830,7 @@ asm(
 "cmpb	$0, " __stringify(KVM_STEAL_TIME_preempted) "+steal_time(%rax);"
 "setne	%al;"
 "ret;"
+".size __raw_callee_save___kvm_vcpu_is_preempted, .-__raw_callee_save___kvm_vcpu_is_preempted;"
 ".popsection");
 
 #endif

arch/x86/kernel/sysfb_efi.c

@@ -231,9 +231,55 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id efifb_dmi_system_table[] __initconst = {
 	{},
 };
 
+/*
+ * Some devices have a portrait LCD but advertise a landscape resolution (and
+ * pitch). We simply swap width and height for these devices so that we can
+ * correctly deal with some of them coming with multiple resolutions.
+ */
+static const struct dmi_system_id efifb_dmi_swap_width_height[] __initconst = {
+	{
+		/*
+		 * Lenovo MIIX310-10ICR, only some batches have the troublesome
+		 * 800x1280 portrait screen. Luckily the portrait version has
+		 * its own BIOS version, so we match on that.
+		 */
+		.matches = {
+			DMI_EXACT_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "LENOVO"),
+			DMI_EXACT_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_VERSION, "MIIX 310-10ICR"),
+			DMI_EXACT_MATCH(DMI_BIOS_VERSION, "1HCN44WW"),
+		},
+	},
+	{
+		/* Lenovo MIIX 320-10ICR with 800x1280 portrait screen */
+		.matches = {
+			DMI_EXACT_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "LENOVO"),
+			DMI_EXACT_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_VERSION,
+					"Lenovo MIIX 320-10ICR"),
+		},
+	},
+	{
+		/* Lenovo D330 with 800x1280 or 1200x1920 portrait screen */
+		.matches = {
+			DMI_EXACT_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "LENOVO"),
+			DMI_EXACT_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_VERSION,
+					"Lenovo ideapad D330-10IGM"),
+		},
+	},
+	{},
+};
+
 __init void sysfb_apply_efi_quirks(void)
 {
 	if (screen_info.orig_video_isVGA != VIDEO_TYPE_EFI ||
 	    !(screen_info.capabilities & VIDEO_CAPABILITY_SKIP_QUIRKS))
 		dmi_check_system(efifb_dmi_system_table);
+
+	if (screen_info.orig_video_isVGA == VIDEO_TYPE_EFI &&
+	    dmi_check_system(efifb_dmi_swap_width_height)) {
+		u16 temp = screen_info.lfb_width;
+
+		screen_info.lfb_width = screen_info.lfb_height;
+		screen_info.lfb_height = temp;
+		screen_info.lfb_linelength = 4 * screen_info.lfb_width;
+	}
 }

arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h

@@ -47,8 +47,6 @@ static const struct cpuid_reg reverse_cpuid[] = {
 	[CPUID_8000_0001_ECX] = {0x80000001, 0, CPUID_ECX},
 	[CPUID_7_0_EBX]       = {         7, 0, CPUID_EBX},
 	[CPUID_D_1_EAX]       = {       0xd, 1, CPUID_EAX},
-	[CPUID_F_0_EDX]       = {       0xf, 0, CPUID_EDX},
-	[CPUID_F_1_EDX]       = {       0xf, 1, CPUID_EDX},
 	[CPUID_8000_0008_EBX] = {0x80000008, 0, CPUID_EBX},
 	[CPUID_6_EAX]         = {         6, 0, CPUID_EAX},
 	[CPUID_8000_000A_EDX] = {0x8000000a, 0, CPUID_EDX},

arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c

@@ -4532,11 +4532,11 @@ static void update_permission_bitmask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 		 */
 
 		/* Faults from writes to non-writable pages */
-		u8 wf = (pfec & PFERR_WRITE_MASK) ? ~w : 0;
+		u8 wf = (pfec & PFERR_WRITE_MASK) ? (u8)~w : 0;
 		/* Faults from user mode accesses to supervisor pages */
-		u8 uf = (pfec & PFERR_USER_MASK) ? ~u : 0;
+		u8 uf = (pfec & PFERR_USER_MASK) ? (u8)~u : 0;
 		/* Faults from fetches of non-executable pages*/
-		u8 ff = (pfec & PFERR_FETCH_MASK) ? ~x : 0;
+		u8 ff = (pfec & PFERR_FETCH_MASK) ? (u8)~x : 0;
 		/* Faults from kernel mode fetches of user pages */
 		u8 smepf = 0;
 		/* Faults from kernel mode accesses of user pages */

arch/x86/math-emu/fpu_emu.h

@@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ static inline void reg_copy(FPU_REG const *x, FPU_REG *y)
 #define setexponentpos(x,y) { (*(short *)&((x)->exp)) = \
   ((y) + EXTENDED_Ebias) & 0x7fff; }
 #define exponent16(x)         (*(short *)&((x)->exp))
-#define setexponent16(x,y)  { (*(short *)&((x)->exp)) = (y); }
+#define setexponent16(x,y)  { (*(short *)&((x)->exp)) = (u16)(y); }
 #define addexponent(x,y)    { (*(short *)&((x)->exp)) += (y); }
 #define stdexp(x)           { (*(short *)&((x)->exp)) += EXTENDED_Ebias; }
 

arch/x86/math-emu/reg_constant.c

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
 #include "control_w.h"
 
 #define MAKE_REG(s, e, l, h) { l, h, \
-		((EXTENDED_Ebias+(e)) | ((SIGN_##s != 0)*0x8000)) }
+		(u16)((EXTENDED_Ebias+(e)) | ((SIGN_##s != 0)*0x8000)) }
 
 FPU_REG const CONST_1 = MAKE_REG(POS, 0, 0x00000000, 0x80000000);
 #if 0

arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c

@@ -597,12 +597,12 @@ struct trap_array_entry {
 
 static struct trap_array_entry trap_array[] = {
 	{ debug,                       xen_xendebug,                    true },
-	{ int3,                        xen_xenint3,                     true },
 	{ double_fault,                xen_double_fault,                true },
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_MCE
 	{ machine_check,               xen_machine_check,               true },
 #endif
 	{ nmi,                         xen_xennmi,                      true },
+	{ int3,                        xen_int3,                        false },
 	{ overflow,                    xen_overflow,                    false },
 #ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION
 	{ entry_INT80_compat,          xen_entry_INT80_compat,          false },

arch/x86/xen/xen-asm_64.S

@@ -30,7 +30,6 @@ xen_pv_trap divide_error
 xen_pv_trap debug
 xen_pv_trap xendebug
 xen_pv_trap int3
-xen_pv_trap xenint3
 xen_pv_trap xennmi
 xen_pv_trap overflow
 xen_pv_trap bounds

block/bio-integrity.c

@@ -291,8 +291,12 @@ bool bio_integrity_prep(struct bio *bio)
 		ret = bio_integrity_add_page(bio, virt_to_page(buf),
 					     bytes, offset);
 
-		if (ret == 0)
-			return false;
+		if (ret == 0) {
+			printk(KERN_ERR "could not attach integrity payload\n");
+			kfree(buf);
+			status = BLK_STS_RESOURCE;
+			goto err_end_io;
+		}
 
 		if (ret < bytes)
 			break;

block/blk-core.c

@@ -198,6 +198,7 @@ void blk_rq_init(struct request_queue *q, struct request *rq)
 	rq->internal_tag = -1;
 	rq->start_time_ns = ktime_get_ns();
 	rq->part = NULL;
+	refcount_set(&rq->ref, 1);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(blk_rq_init);
 
@@ -420,24 +421,25 @@ void blk_sync_queue(struct request_queue *q)
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(blk_sync_queue);
 
 /**
- * blk_set_preempt_only - set QUEUE_FLAG_PREEMPT_ONLY
+ * blk_set_pm_only - increment pm_only counter
  * @q: request queue pointer
- *
- * Returns the previous value of the PREEMPT_ONLY flag - 0 if the flag was not
- * set and 1 if the flag was already set.
  */
-int blk_set_preempt_only(struct request_queue *q)
+void blk_set_pm_only(struct request_queue *q)
 {
-	return blk_queue_flag_test_and_set(QUEUE_FLAG_PREEMPT_ONLY, q);
+	atomic_inc(&q->pm_only);
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(blk_set_preempt_only);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(blk_set_pm_only);
 
-void blk_clear_preempt_only(struct request_queue *q)
+void blk_clear_pm_only(struct request_queue *q)
 {
-	blk_queue_flag_clear(QUEUE_FLAG_PREEMPT_ONLY, q);
+	int pm_only;
+
+	pm_only = atomic_dec_return(&q->pm_only);
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(pm_only < 0);
+	if (pm_only == 0)
 		wake_up_all(&q->mq_freeze_wq);
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(blk_clear_preempt_only);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(blk_clear_pm_only);
 
 /**
  * __blk_run_queue_uncond - run a queue whether or not it has been stopped
@@ -915,7 +917,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(blk_alloc_queue);
  */
 int blk_queue_enter(struct request_queue *q, blk_mq_req_flags_t flags)
 {
-	const bool preempt = flags & BLK_MQ_REQ_PREEMPT;
+	const bool pm = flags & BLK_MQ_REQ_PREEMPT;
 
 	while (true) {
 		bool success = false;
@@ -923,11 +925,11 @@ int blk_queue_enter(struct request_queue *q, blk_mq_req_flags_t flags)
 		rcu_read_lock();
 		if (percpu_ref_tryget_live(&q->q_usage_counter)) {
 			/*
-			 * The code that sets the PREEMPT_ONLY flag is
-			 * responsible for ensuring that that flag is globally
-			 * visible before the queue is unfrozen.
+			 * The code that increments the pm_only counter is
+			 * responsible for ensuring that that counter is
+			 * globally visible before the queue is unfrozen.
 			 */
-			if (preempt || !blk_queue_preempt_only(q)) {
+			if (pm || !blk_queue_pm_only(q)) {
 				success = true;
 			} else {
 				percpu_ref_put(&q->q_usage_counter);
@@ -952,7 +954,7 @@ int blk_queue_enter(struct request_queue *q, blk_mq_req_flags_t flags)
 
 		wait_event(q->mq_freeze_wq,
 			   (atomic_read(&q->mq_freeze_depth) == 0 &&
-			    (preempt || !blk_queue_preempt_only(q))) ||
+			    (pm || !blk_queue_pm_only(q))) ||
 			   blk_queue_dying(q));
 		if (blk_queue_dying(q))
 			return -ENODEV;

block/blk-mq-debugfs.c

@@ -102,6 +102,14 @@ static int blk_flags_show(struct seq_file *m, const unsigned long flags,
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int queue_pm_only_show(void *data, struct seq_file *m)
+{
+	struct request_queue *q = data;
+
+	seq_printf(m, "%d\n", atomic_read(&q->pm_only));
+	return 0;
+}
+
 #define QUEUE_FLAG_NAME(name) [QUEUE_FLAG_##name] = #name
 static const char *const blk_queue_flag_name[] = {
 	QUEUE_FLAG_NAME(QUEUED),
@@ -132,7 +140,6 @@ static const char *const blk_queue_flag_name[] = {
 	QUEUE_FLAG_NAME(REGISTERED),
 	QUEUE_FLAG_NAME(SCSI_PASSTHROUGH),
 	QUEUE_FLAG_NAME(QUIESCED),
-	QUEUE_FLAG_NAME(PREEMPT_ONLY),
 };
 #undef QUEUE_FLAG_NAME
 
@@ -209,6 +216,7 @@ static ssize_t queue_write_hint_store(void *data, const char __user *buf,
 static const struct blk_mq_debugfs_attr blk_mq_debugfs_queue_attrs[] = {
 	{ "poll_stat", 0400, queue_poll_stat_show },
 	{ "requeue_list", 0400, .seq_ops = &queue_requeue_list_seq_ops },
+	{ "pm_only", 0600, queue_pm_only_show, NULL },
 	{ "state", 0600, queue_state_show, queue_state_write },
 	{ "write_hints", 0600, queue_write_hint_show, queue_write_hint_store },
 	{ "zone_wlock", 0400, queue_zone_wlock_show, NULL },

drivers/acpi/blacklist.c

@@ -30,7 +30,9 @@
 
 #include "internal.h"
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_DMI
 static const struct dmi_system_id acpi_rev_dmi_table[] __initconst;
+#endif
 
 /*
  * POLICY: If *anything* doesn't work, put it on the blacklist.
@@ -74,7 +76,9 @@ int __init acpi_blacklisted(void)
 	}
 
 	(void)early_acpi_osi_init();
+#ifdef CONFIG_DMI
 	dmi_check_system(acpi_rev_dmi_table);
+#endif
 
 	return blacklisted;
 }

drivers/android/binder.c

@@ -2138,8 +2138,18 @@ static struct binder_thread *binder_get_txn_from_and_acq_inner(
 
 static void binder_free_transaction(struct binder_transaction *t)
 {
+	struct binder_proc *target_proc = t->to_proc;
+
+	if (target_proc) {
+		binder_inner_proc_lock(target_proc);
 		if (t->buffer)
 			t->buffer->transaction = NULL;
+		binder_inner_proc_unlock(target_proc);
+	}
+	/*
+	 * If the transaction has no target_proc, then
+	 * t->buffer->transaction has already been cleared.
+	 */
 	kfree(t);
 	binder_stats_deleted(BINDER_STAT_TRANSACTION);
 }
@@ -3104,7 +3114,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,
 			else
 				return_error = BR_DEAD_REPLY;
 			mutex_unlock(&context->context_mgr_node_lock);
-			if (target_node && target_proc == proc) {
+			if (target_node && target_proc->pid == proc->pid) {
 				binder_user_error("%d:%d got transaction to context manager from process owning it\n",
 						  proc->pid, thread->pid);
 				return_error = BR_FAILED_REPLY;
@@ -3848,10 +3858,12 @@ static int binder_thread_write(struct binder_proc *proc,
 				     buffer->debug_id,
 				     buffer->transaction ? "active" : "finished");
 
+			binder_inner_proc_lock(proc);
 			if (buffer->transaction) {
 				buffer->transaction->buffer = NULL;
 				buffer->transaction = NULL;
 			}
+			binder_inner_proc_unlock(proc);
 			if (buffer->async_transaction && buffer->target_node) {
 				struct binder_node *buf_node;
 				struct binder_work *w;

drivers/atm/iphase.c

@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@
 #include <asm/byteorder.h>  
 #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
 #include <linux/jiffies.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
 #include "iphase.h"		  
 #include "suni.h"		  
 #define swap_byte_order(x) (((x & 0xff) << 8) | ((x & 0xff00) >> 8))
@@ -2760,8 +2761,11 @@ static int ia_ioctl(struct atm_dev *dev, unsigned int cmd, void __user *arg)
    }
    if (copy_from_user(&ia_cmds, arg, sizeof ia_cmds)) return -EFAULT; 
    board = ia_cmds.status;
+
 	if ((board < 0) || (board > iadev_count))
 		board = 0;
+	board = array_index_nospec(board, iadev_count + 1);
+
    iadev = ia_dev[board];
    switch (ia_cmds.cmd) {
    case MEMDUMP:

drivers/base/base.h

@@ -66,6 +66,9 @@ struct driver_private {
  *	probed first.
  * @device - pointer back to the struct device that this structure is
  * associated with.
+ * @dead - This device is currently either in the process of or has been
+ *	removed from the system. Any asynchronous events scheduled for this
+ *	device should exit without taking any action.
  *
  * Nothing outside of the driver core should ever touch these fields.
  */
@@ -76,6 +79,7 @@ struct device_private {
 	struct klist_node knode_bus;
 	struct list_head deferred_probe;
 	struct device *device;
+	u8 dead:1;
 };
 #define to_device_private_parent(obj)	\
 	container_of(obj, struct device_private, knode_parent)

drivers/base/core.c

@@ -2036,6 +2036,24 @@ void put_device(struct device *dev)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(put_device);
 
+bool kill_device(struct device *dev)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Require the device lock and set the "dead" flag to guarantee that
+	 * the update behavior is consistent with the other bitfields near
+	 * it and that we cannot have an asynchronous probe routine trying
+	 * to run while we are tearing out the bus/class/sysfs from
+	 * underneath the device.
+	 */
+	lockdep_assert_held(&dev->mutex);
+
+	if (dev->p->dead)
+		return false;
+	dev->p->dead = true;
+	return true;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kill_device);
+
 /**
  * device_del - delete device from system.
  * @dev: device.
@@ -2055,6 +2073,10 @@ void device_del(struct device *dev)
 	struct kobject *glue_dir = NULL;
 	struct class_interface *class_intf;
 
+	device_lock(dev);
+	kill_device(dev);
+	device_unlock(dev);
+
 	/* Notify clients of device removal.  This call must come
 	 * before dpm_sysfs_remove().
 	 */

drivers/base/dd.c

@@ -746,15 +746,6 @@ static int __device_attach_driver(struct device_driver *drv, void *_data)
 	bool async_allowed;
 	int ret;
 
-	/*
-	 * Check if device has already been claimed. This may
-	 * happen with driver loading, device discovery/registration,
-	 * and deferred probe processing happens all at once with
-	 * multiple threads.
-	 */
-	if (dev->driver)
-		return -EBUSY;
-
 	ret = driver_match_device(drv, dev);
 	if (ret == 0) {
 		/* no match */
@@ -789,6 +780,15 @@ static void __device_attach_async_helper(void *_dev, async_cookie_t cookie)
 
 	device_lock(dev);
 
+	/*
+	 * Check if device has already been removed or claimed. This may
+	 * happen with driver loading, device discovery/registration,
+	 * and deferred probe processing happens all at once with
+	 * multiple threads.
+	 */
+	if (dev->p->dead || dev->driver)
+		goto out_unlock;
+
 	if (dev->parent)
 		pm_runtime_get_sync(dev->parent);
 
@@ -799,7 +799,7 @@ static void __device_attach_async_helper(void *_dev, async_cookie_t cookie)
 
 	if (dev->parent)
 		pm_runtime_put(dev->parent);
-
+out_unlock:
 	device_unlock(dev);
 
 	put_device(dev);
@@ -912,7 +912,7 @@ static int __driver_attach(struct device *dev, void *data)
 	if (dev->parent && dev->bus->need_parent_lock)
 		device_lock(dev->parent);
 	device_lock(dev);
-	if (!dev->driver)
+	if (!dev->p->dead && !dev->driver)
 		driver_probe_device(drv, dev);
 	device_unlock(dev);
 	if (dev->parent && dev->bus->need_parent_lock)

drivers/block/nbd.c

@@ -1218,7 +1218,7 @@ static void nbd_clear_sock_ioctl(struct nbd_device *nbd,
 				 struct block_device *bdev)
 {
 	sock_shutdown(nbd);
-	kill_bdev(bdev);
+	__invalidate_device(bdev, true);
 	nbd_bdev_reset(bdev);
 	if (test_and_clear_bit(NBD_HAS_CONFIG_REF,
 			       &nbd->config->runtime_flags))

drivers/bluetooth/hci_ath.c

@@ -112,6 +112,9 @@ static int ath_open(struct hci_uart *hu)
 
 	BT_DBG("hu %p", hu);
 
+	if (!hci_uart_has_flow_control(hu))
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
 	ath = kzalloc(sizeof(*ath), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!ath)
 		return -ENOMEM;

drivers/bluetooth/hci_bcm.c

@@ -369,6 +369,9 @@ static int bcm_open(struct hci_uart *hu)
 
 	bt_dev_dbg(hu->hdev, "hu %p", hu);
 
+	if (!hci_uart_has_flow_control(hu))
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
 	bcm = kzalloc(sizeof(*bcm), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!bcm)
 		return -ENOMEM;

drivers/bluetooth/hci_intel.c

@@ -406,6 +406,9 @@ static int intel_open(struct hci_uart *hu)
 
 	BT_DBG("hu %p", hu);
 
+	if (!hci_uart_has_flow_control(hu))
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
 	intel = kzalloc(sizeof(*intel), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!intel)
 		return -ENOMEM;

drivers/bluetooth/hci_ldisc.c

@@ -299,6 +299,19 @@ static int hci_uart_send_frame(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+/* Check the underlying device or tty has flow control support */
+bool hci_uart_has_flow_control(struct hci_uart *hu)
+{
+	/* serdev nodes check if the needed operations are present */
+	if (hu->serdev)
+		return true;
+
+	if (hu->tty->driver->ops->tiocmget && hu->tty->driver->ops->tiocmset)
+		return true;
+
+	return false;
+}
+
 /* Flow control or un-flow control the device */
 void hci_uart_set_flow_control(struct hci_uart *hu, bool enable)
 {

drivers/bluetooth/hci_mrvl.c

@@ -66,6 +66,9 @@ static int mrvl_open(struct hci_uart *hu)
 
 	BT_DBG("hu %p", hu);
 
+	if (!hci_uart_has_flow_control(hu))
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
 	mrvl = kzalloc(sizeof(*mrvl), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!mrvl)
 		return -ENOMEM;

drivers/bluetooth/hci_qca.c

@@ -450,6 +450,9 @@ static int qca_open(struct hci_uart *hu)
 
 	BT_DBG("hu %p qca_open", hu);
 
+	if (!hci_uart_has_flow_control(hu))
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
 	qca = kzalloc(sizeof(struct qca_data), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!qca)
 		return -ENOMEM;

drivers/bluetooth/hci_uart.h

@@ -118,6 +118,7 @@ int hci_uart_tx_wakeup(struct hci_uart *hu);
 int hci_uart_init_ready(struct hci_uart *hu);
 void hci_uart_init_work(struct work_struct *work);
 void hci_uart_set_baudrate(struct hci_uart *hu, unsigned int speed);
+bool hci_uart_has_flow_control(struct hci_uart *hu);
 void hci_uart_set_flow_control(struct hci_uart *hu, bool enable);
 void hci_uart_set_speeds(struct hci_uart *hu, unsigned int init_speed,
 			 unsigned int oper_speed);

drivers/char/hpet.c

@@ -570,8 +570,7 @@ static inline unsigned long hpet_time_div(struct hpets *hpets,
 	unsigned long long m;
 
 	m = hpets->hp_tick_freq + (dis >> 1);
-	do_div(m, dis);
-	return (unsigned long)m;
+	return div64_ul(m, dis);
 }
 
 static int

drivers/clk/sprd/sc9860-clk.c

@@ -2023,6 +2023,7 @@ static int sc9860_clk_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 {
 	const struct of_device_id *match;
 	const struct sprd_clk_desc *desc;
+	int ret;
 
 	match = of_match_node(sprd_sc9860_clk_ids, pdev->dev.of_node);
 	if (!match) {
@@ -2031,7 +2032,9 @@ static int sc9860_clk_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	}
 
 	desc = match->data;
-	sprd_clk_regmap_init(pdev, desc);
+	ret = sprd_clk_regmap_init(pdev, desc);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
 
 	return sprd_clk_probe(&pdev->dev, desc->hw_clks);
 }

drivers/clk/tegra/clk-tegra210.c

@@ -2214,9 +2214,9 @@ static struct div_nmp pllu_nmp = {
 };
 
 static struct tegra_clk_pll_freq_table pll_u_freq_table[] = {
-	{ 12000000, 480000000, 40, 1, 0, 0 },
-	{ 13000000, 480000000, 36, 1, 0, 0 }, /* actual: 468.0 MHz */
-	{ 38400000, 480000000, 25, 2, 0, 0 },
+	{ 12000000, 480000000, 40, 1, 1, 0 },
+	{ 13000000, 480000000, 36, 1, 1, 0 }, /* actual: 468.0 MHz */
+	{ 38400000, 480000000, 25, 2, 1, 0 },
 	{        0,         0,  0, 0, 0, 0 },
 };
 
@@ -3343,6 +3343,7 @@ static struct tegra_clk_init_table init_table[] __initdata = {
 	{ TEGRA210_CLK_DFLL_REF, TEGRA210_CLK_PLL_P, 51000000, 1 },
 	{ TEGRA210_CLK_SBC4, TEGRA210_CLK_PLL_P, 12000000, 1 },
 	{ TEGRA210_CLK_PLL_RE_VCO, TEGRA210_CLK_CLK_MAX, 672000000, 1 },
+	{ TEGRA210_CLK_PLL_U_OUT1, TEGRA210_CLK_CLK_MAX, 48000000, 1 },
 	{ TEGRA210_CLK_XUSB_GATE, TEGRA210_CLK_CLK_MAX, 0, 1 },
 	{ TEGRA210_CLK_XUSB_SS_SRC, TEGRA210_CLK_PLL_U_480M, 120000000, 0 },
 	{ TEGRA210_CLK_XUSB_FS_SRC, TEGRA210_CLK_PLL_U_48M, 48000000, 0 },
@@ -3367,7 +3368,6 @@ static struct tegra_clk_init_table init_table[] __initdata = {
 	{ TEGRA210_CLK_PLL_DP, TEGRA210_CLK_CLK_MAX, 270000000, 0 },
 	{ TEGRA210_CLK_SOC_THERM, TEGRA210_CLK_PLL_P, 51000000, 0 },
 	{ TEGRA210_CLK_CCLK_G, TEGRA210_CLK_CLK_MAX, 0, 1 },
-	{ TEGRA210_CLK_PLL_U_OUT1, TEGRA210_CLK_CLK_MAX, 48000000, 1 },
 	{ TEGRA210_CLK_PLL_U_OUT2, TEGRA210_CLK_CLK_MAX, 60000000, 1 },
 	/* This MUST be the last entry. */
 	{ TEGRA210_CLK_CLK_MAX, TEGRA210_CLK_CLK_MAX, 0, 0 },

drivers/dma/sh/rcar-dmac.c

@@ -1164,7 +1164,7 @@ rcar_dmac_prep_slave_sg(struct dma_chan *chan, struct scatterlist *sgl,
 	struct rcar_dmac_chan *rchan = to_rcar_dmac_chan(chan);
 
 	/* Someone calling slave DMA on a generic channel? */
-	if (rchan->mid_rid < 0 || !sg_len) {
+	if (rchan->mid_rid < 0 || !sg_len || !sg_dma_len(sgl)) {
 		dev_warn(chan->device->dev,
 			 "%s: bad parameter: len=%d, id=%d\n",
 			 __func__, sg_len, rchan->mid_rid);

drivers/dma/tegra20-apb-dma.c

@@ -981,8 +981,12 @@ static struct dma_async_tx_descriptor *tegra_dma_prep_slave_sg(
 		csr |= tdc->slave_id << TEGRA_APBDMA_CSR_REQ_SEL_SHIFT;
 	}
 
-	if (flags & DMA_PREP_INTERRUPT)
+	if (flags & DMA_PREP_INTERRUPT) {
 		csr |= TEGRA_APBDMA_CSR_IE_EOC;
+	} else {
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+		return NULL;
+	}
 
 	apb_seq |= TEGRA_APBDMA_APBSEQ_WRAP_WORD_1;
 
@@ -1124,8 +1128,12 @@ static struct dma_async_tx_descriptor *tegra_dma_prep_dma_cyclic(
 		csr |= tdc->slave_id << TEGRA_APBDMA_CSR_REQ_SEL_SHIFT;
 	}
 
-	if (flags & DMA_PREP_INTERRUPT)
+	if (flags & DMA_PREP_INTERRUPT) {
 		csr |= TEGRA_APBDMA_CSR_IE_EOC;
+	} else {
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+		return NULL;
+	}
 
 	apb_seq |= TEGRA_APBDMA_APBSEQ_WRAP_WORD_1;
 

drivers/firmware/psci_checker.c

@@ -366,16 +366,16 @@ static int suspend_test_thread(void *arg)
 	for (;;) {
 		/* Needs to be set first to avoid missing a wakeup. */
 		set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
-		if (kthread_should_stop()) {
-			__set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
+		if (kthread_should_park())
 			break;
-		}
 		schedule();
 	}
 
 	pr_info("CPU %d suspend test results: success %d, shallow states %d, errors %d\n",
 		cpu, nb_suspend, nb_shallow_sleep, nb_err);
 
+	kthread_parkme();
+
 	return nb_err;
 }
 
@@ -440,8 +440,10 @@ static int suspend_tests(void)
 
 
 	/* Stop and destroy all threads, get return status. */
-	for (i = 0; i < nb_threads; ++i)
+	for (i = 0; i < nb_threads; ++i) {
+		err += kthread_park(threads[i]);
 		err += kthread_stop(threads[i]);
+	}
  out:
 	cpuidle_resume_and_unlock();
 	kfree(threads);

drivers/fpga/Kconfig

@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ config ALTERA_PR_IP_CORE_PLAT
 config FPGA_MGR_ALTERA_PS_SPI
 	tristate "Altera FPGA Passive Serial over SPI"
 	depends on SPI
+	select BITREVERSE
 	help
 	  FPGA manager driver support for Altera Arria/Cyclone/Stratix
 	  using the passive serial interface over SPI.

drivers/gpio/gpiolib.c

@@ -946,9 +946,11 @@ static int lineevent_create(struct gpio_device *gdev, void __user *ip)
 	}
 
 	if (eflags & GPIOEVENT_REQUEST_RISING_EDGE)
-		irqflags |= IRQF_TRIGGER_RISING;
+		irqflags |= test_bit(FLAG_ACTIVE_LOW, &desc->flags) ?
+			IRQF_TRIGGER_FALLING : IRQF_TRIGGER_RISING;
 	if (eflags & GPIOEVENT_REQUEST_FALLING_EDGE)
-		irqflags |= IRQF_TRIGGER_FALLING;
+		irqflags |= test_bit(FLAG_ACTIVE_LOW, &desc->flags) ?
+			IRQF_TRIGGER_RISING : IRQF_TRIGGER_FALLING;
 	irqflags |= IRQF_ONESHOT;
 	irqflags |= IRQF_SHARED;
 

drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/gmc_v9_0.c

@@ -1037,6 +1037,9 @@ static int gmc_v9_0_gart_enable(struct amdgpu_device *adev)
 	tmp = RREG32_SOC15(HDP, 0, mmHDP_HOST_PATH_CNTL);
 	WREG32_SOC15(HDP, 0, mmHDP_HOST_PATH_CNTL, tmp);
 
+	WREG32_SOC15(HDP, 0, mmHDP_NONSURFACE_BASE, (adev->gmc.vram_start >> 8));
+	WREG32_SOC15(HDP, 0, mmHDP_NONSURFACE_BASE_HI, (adev->gmc.vram_start >> 40));
+
 	/* After HDP is initialized, flush HDP.*/
 	adev->nbio_funcs->hdp_flush(adev, NULL);
 

drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_device_queue_manager.c

@@ -1268,12 +1268,17 @@ int amdkfd_fence_wait_timeout(unsigned int *fence_addr,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int unmap_sdma_queues(struct device_queue_manager *dqm,
-				unsigned int sdma_engine)
+static int unmap_sdma_queues(struct device_queue_manager *dqm)
 {
-	return pm_send_unmap_queue(&dqm->packets, KFD_QUEUE_TYPE_SDMA,
-			KFD_UNMAP_QUEUES_FILTER_DYNAMIC_QUEUES, 0, false,
-			sdma_engine);
+	int i, retval = 0;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < dqm->dev->device_info->num_sdma_engines; i++) {
+		retval = pm_send_unmap_queue(&dqm->packets, KFD_QUEUE_TYPE_SDMA,
+			KFD_UNMAP_QUEUES_FILTER_DYNAMIC_QUEUES, 0, false, i);
+		if (retval)
+			return retval;
+	}
+	return retval;
 }
 
 /* dqm->lock mutex has to be locked before calling this function */
@@ -1312,10 +1317,8 @@ static int unmap_queues_cpsch(struct device_queue_manager *dqm,
 	pr_debug("Before destroying queues, sdma queue count is : %u\n",
 		dqm->sdma_queue_count);
 
-	if (dqm->sdma_queue_count > 0) {
-		unmap_sdma_queues(dqm, 0);
-		unmap_sdma_queues(dqm, 1);
-	}
+	if (dqm->sdma_queue_count > 0)
+		unmap_sdma_queues(dqm);
 
 	retval = pm_send_unmap_queue(&dqm->packets, KFD_QUEUE_TYPE_COMPUTE,
 			filter, filter_param, false, 0);

drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_mqd_manager_v9.c

@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@ static int init_mqd(struct mqd_manager *mm, void **mqd,
 	struct v9_mqd *m;
 	struct kfd_dev *kfd = mm->dev;
 
+	*mqd_mem_obj = NULL;
 	/* From V9,  for CWSR, the control stack is located on the next page
 	 * boundary after the mqd, we will use the gtt allocation function
 	 * instead of sub-allocation function.
@@ -92,8 +93,10 @@ static int init_mqd(struct mqd_manager *mm, void **mqd,
 	} else
 		retval = kfd_gtt_sa_allocate(mm->dev, sizeof(struct v9_mqd),
 				mqd_mem_obj);
-	if (retval != 0)
+	if (retval) {
+		kfree(*mqd_mem_obj);
 		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
 
 	m = (struct v9_mqd *) (*mqd_mem_obj)->cpu_ptr;
 	addr = (*mqd_mem_obj)->gpu_addr;

drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm.c

@@ -3644,6 +3644,13 @@ void amdgpu_dm_connector_init_helper(struct amdgpu_display_manager *dm,
 {
 	struct amdgpu_device *adev = dm->ddev->dev_private;
 
+	/*
+	 * Some of the properties below require access to state, like bpc.
+	 * Allocate some default initial connector state with our reset helper.
+	 */
+	if (aconnector->base.funcs->reset)
+		aconnector->base.funcs->reset(&aconnector->base);
+
 	aconnector->connector_id = link_index;
 	aconnector->dc_link = link;
 	aconnector->base.interlace_allowed = false;
@@ -3811,9 +3818,6 @@ static int amdgpu_dm_connector_init(struct amdgpu_display_manager *dm,
 			&aconnector->base,
 			&amdgpu_dm_connector_helper_funcs);
 
-	if (aconnector->base.funcs->reset)
-		aconnector->base.funcs->reset(&aconnector->base);
-
 	amdgpu_dm_connector_init_helper(
 		dm,
 		aconnector,

drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dce/dce_abm.c

@@ -474,6 +474,8 @@ void dce_abm_destroy(struct abm **abm)
 {
 	struct dce_abm *abm_dce = TO_DCE_ABM(*abm);
 
+	abm_dce->base.funcs->set_abm_immediate_disable(*abm);
+
 	kfree(abm_dce);
 	*abm = NULL;
 }

drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dce110/dce110_hw_sequencer.c

@@ -242,6 +242,9 @@ static void build_prescale_params(struct ipp_prescale_params *prescale_params,
 	prescale_params->mode = IPP_PRESCALE_MODE_FIXED_UNSIGNED;
 
 	switch (plane_state->format) {
+	case SURFACE_PIXEL_FORMAT_GRPH_RGB565:
+		prescale_params->scale = 0x2082;
+		break;
 	case SURFACE_PIXEL_FORMAT_GRPH_ARGB8888:
 	case SURFACE_PIXEL_FORMAT_GRPH_ABGR8888:
 		prescale_params->scale = 0x2020;

drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dcn10/dcn10_hw_sequencer.c

@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
  *
  */
 
+#include <linux/delay.h>
 #include "dm_services.h"
 #include "core_types.h"
 #include "resource.h"

drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/sii902x.c

@@ -261,10 +261,11 @@ static void sii902x_bridge_mode_set(struct drm_bridge *bridge,
 	struct regmap *regmap = sii902x->regmap;
 	u8 buf[HDMI_INFOFRAME_SIZE(AVI)];
 	struct hdmi_avi_infoframe frame;
+	u16 pixel_clock_10kHz = adj->clock / 10;
 	int ret;
 
-	buf[0] = adj->clock;
-	buf[1] = adj->clock >> 8;
+	buf[0] = pixel_clock_10kHz & 0xff;
+	buf[1] = pixel_clock_10kHz >> 8;
 	buf[2] = adj->vrefresh;
 	buf[3] = 0x00;
 	buf[4] = adj->hdisplay;

drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/tc358767.c

@@ -1149,6 +1149,13 @@ static int tc_connector_get_modes(struct drm_connector *connector)
 	struct tc_data *tc = connector_to_tc(connector);
 	struct edid *edid;
 	unsigned int count;
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = tc_get_display_props(tc);
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		dev_err(tc->dev, "failed to read display props: %d\n", ret);
+		return 0;
+	}
 
 	if (tc->panel && tc->panel->funcs && tc->panel->funcs->get_modes) {
 		count = tc->panel->funcs->get_modes(tc->panel);

drivers/gpu/drm/drm_debugfs_crc.c

@@ -379,12 +379,13 @@ int drm_crtc_add_crc_entry(struct drm_crtc *crtc, bool has_frame,
 	struct drm_crtc_crc *crc = &crtc->crc;
 	struct drm_crtc_crc_entry *entry;
 	int head, tail;
+	unsigned long flags;
 
-	spin_lock(&crc->lock);
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&crc->lock, flags);
 
 	/* Caller may not have noticed yet that userspace has stopped reading */
 	if (!crc->entries) {
-		spin_unlock(&crc->lock);
+		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&crc->lock, flags);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
@@ -395,7 +396,7 @@ int drm_crtc_add_crc_entry(struct drm_crtc *crtc, bool has_frame,
 		bool was_overflow = crc->overflow;
 
 		crc->overflow = true;
-		spin_unlock(&crc->lock);
+		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&crc->lock, flags);
 
 		if (!was_overflow)
 			DRM_ERROR("Overflow of CRC buffer, userspace reads too slow.\n");
@@ -411,7 +412,7 @@ int drm_crtc_add_crc_entry(struct drm_crtc *crtc, bool has_frame,
 	head = (head + 1) & (DRM_CRC_ENTRIES_NR - 1);
 	crc->head = head;
 
-	spin_unlock(&crc->lock);
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&crc->lock, flags);
 
 	wake_up_interruptible(&crc->wq);
 

drivers/gpu/drm/drm_edid_load.c

@@ -290,6 +290,8 @@ struct edid *drm_load_edid_firmware(struct drm_connector *connector)
 	 * the last one found one as a fallback.
 	 */
 	fwstr = kstrdup(edid_firmware, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!fwstr)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
 	edidstr = fwstr;
 
 	while ((edidname = strsep(&edidstr, ","))) {

drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gvt/kvmgt.c

@@ -1741,6 +1741,18 @@ int kvmgt_dma_map_guest_page(unsigned long handle, unsigned long gfn,
 
 	entry = __gvt_cache_find_gfn(info->vgpu, gfn);
 	if (!entry) {
+		ret = gvt_dma_map_page(vgpu, gfn, dma_addr, size);
+		if (ret)
+			goto err_unlock;
+
+		ret = __gvt_cache_add(info->vgpu, gfn, *dma_addr, size);
+		if (ret)
+			goto err_unmap;
+	} else if (entry->size != size) {
+		/* the same gfn with different size: unmap and re-map */
+		gvt_dma_unmap_page(vgpu, gfn, entry->dma_addr, entry->size);
+		__gvt_cache_remove_entry(vgpu, entry);
+
 		ret = gvt_dma_map_page(vgpu, gfn, dma_addr, size);
 		if (ret)
 			goto err_unlock;

drivers/gpu/drm/msm/msm_drv.c

@@ -1336,16 +1336,24 @@ static int msm_pdev_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 
 	ret = add_gpu_components(&pdev->dev, &match);
 	if (ret)
-		return ret;
+		goto fail;
 
 	/* on all devices that I am aware of, iommu's which can map
 	 * any address the cpu can see are used:
 	 */
 	ret = dma_set_mask_and_coherent(&pdev->dev, ~0);
 	if (ret)
-		return ret;
+		goto fail;
 
-	return component_master_add_with_match(&pdev->dev, &msm_drm_ops, match);
+	ret = component_master_add_with_match(&pdev->dev, &msm_drm_ops, match);
+	if (ret)
+		goto fail;
+
+	return 0;
+
+fail:
+	of_platform_depopulate(&pdev->dev);
+	return ret;
 }
 
 static int msm_pdev_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)

drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_connector.c

@@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ nouveau_conn_reset(struct drm_connector *connector)
 		return;
 
 	if (connector->state)
-		__drm_atomic_helper_connector_destroy_state(connector->state);
+		nouveau_conn_atomic_destroy_state(connector, connector->state);
 	__drm_atomic_helper_connector_reset(connector, &asyc->state);
 	asyc->dither.mode = DITHERING_MODE_AUTO;
 	asyc->dither.depth = DITHERING_DEPTH_AUTO;

drivers/gpu/drm/panel/panel-simple.c

@@ -2803,7 +2803,14 @@ static int panel_simple_dsi_probe(struct mipi_dsi_device *dsi)
 	dsi->format = desc->format;
 	dsi->lanes = desc->lanes;
 
-	return mipi_dsi_attach(dsi);
+	err = mipi_dsi_attach(dsi);
+	if (err) {
+		struct panel_simple *panel = dev_get_drvdata(&dsi->dev);
+
+		drm_panel_remove(&panel->base);
+	}
+
+	return err;
 }
 
 static int panel_simple_dsi_remove(struct mipi_dsi_device *dsi)

drivers/gpu/drm/rockchip/rockchip_drm_vop.c

@@ -880,7 +880,8 @@ static bool vop_crtc_mode_fixup(struct drm_crtc *crtc,
 	struct vop *vop = to_vop(crtc);
 
 	adjusted_mode->clock =
-		clk_round_rate(vop->dclk, mode->clock * 1000) / 1000;
+		DIV_ROUND_UP(clk_round_rate(vop->dclk, mode->clock * 1000),
+			     1000);
 
 	return true;
 }